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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
There are things hard to define, despite the fact that we usually
assume that we know what they are. One simple example is ''beauty." Most
of us presuppose that we know what "beauty" means, and use this term in
our daily life. However, it is not easy to explain its precise
definition. The same thing can be said about such things as "freedom,"
"liberty," or "love." In a sense, it is unnecessary to define these
things, since they are things to be experienced or felt rather than
defined intellectually. "Obscenity" is one of the things which we
usually do not bother defining. Probably, many people believe that they
know what "obscenity" is. On the other hand, I suspect that no one can
logically explain what "obscenity" is. As long as this term is used in
the private sphere of life, such ambiguity may be permissible. Just
like other intangible things, obscenity may stay as something to be
perceived intuitively. However, once this term is used legally, we need
to be sure about its meaning.
There are numerous books dealing with the question of obscenity.
In many societies, considerable amounts of effort and resources have
been invested in order to answer the questions surrounding obscenity.
Yet, the obscenity issue is still very controversial in most places in
the modern world. In a sense, this issue is now getting more
complicated. The technological development made larger scale of mass
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communications and many new styles of expression possible.
Industrialization and the world-wide market economy introduced mass-
production and mass-consumption. Social fragmentation has escalated
because of modern individualism, liberalism, and pluralism. Artists
have been getting more diverse in their tastes and themes, and more
challenging to the conventional norms. Because of these factors,
various new sexual representations have appeared in public spaces. As a
result, to answer questions concerning sexual representations is
getting harder in our contemporary society. Donald A. Downs argues that
every society is inherently ambivalent about sexual freedom. Materials
dealing with sexual activity are prevalent in many modern societies,
just because such materials manifest "the tensions that arise between
desire and social norms" (Hall, Ed., 1992, 603). Governments have
struggled with the question how to deal with these materials. Downs
points out that this struggle is particularly acute in a liberal
democracy, because of the conflict between liberal and democratic
principles (Hall, Ed., 1992, 603). In both Japan and the U.S., two
liberal democracies, the regulation of obscene materials has been a
source of disputes for a long time. Despite the premise that no
arbitrary deprivation of certain information or denial of certain ideas
is allowed under the theory of liberal democracy, the standard of
regulating obscenity seems to be highly subjective and even sometimes
arbitrary.
Obscenity includes offensive, indecent or pornographic material.
Precise definitions of "obscene" have been notoriously vague and even
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unworkable. Etymologically, "obscene" may be a modification of the
Latin scena, meaning literally what is off, or to one side of the
stage, beyond presentation (Nead, 1992, 25). The Latin root " obscaenus"
means "ill-omened" or "adverse" (Downs, 1989, 9). Obscenity refers to
those things considered not appropriate to be shown, because of being
disgusting, offensive, filthy, foul, repulsive or morally unhealthy
(Downs, 1989, 9). Downs says that the word "obscenity" is original ly
not only for sexual representation (Downs, 1989, 9). In both the U.S.
and Japan, however, obscenity law has confined the concept of the
obscene to sexually explicit depictions. For example, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that "depictions of violence per se are not obscene" (Downs.
1989, 9). Legally, the criteria for obscenity have been revised over
the decades. Judicial efforts to find a definition of obscenity remain
elusive in both the U.S. and Japan, and what is or is not obscene has
been subjected to a continuous debate. For example, in State v. Lerner
(1948), the Court held that "(O)bscenity is a literary work that tends
to arouse impure sex ideas in minds susceptible of such ideas" (Grazia,
1969, 144). However, this is not a definition but a test. Moreover, it
is not clear how such a test should be applied practically, how a court
can know if a literary work in question arouses sexual ideas in the
reader’s mind, or how a court can decide pureness or impureness of
certain ideas. Until these points are clarified, the courts can censor,
suppress, and punish what they just don’t like. In 1964, United States
Supreme Court Justice Stewart confessed his inability to define
obscenity but claimed "I know it when I see it" ( Jacobellis v. Ohio,
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378 U.S. 184, 197). Such a reliance on subjectivity is the central
problem with obscenity issues. Many scholars have criticized the
definitions which have been too loose and too capricious to be legally
workable. As Gellhorn points out:
Those who urge increased repression of allegedly obscene books are
of course convinced that "obscenity" can be identified. In
reality, however, the word does not refer to a thing so much as to
a mood (Downs, Ed., 1960, 22).
In 1954, in an effort to discern what constitutes obscenity,
Federal Judge Ernest Tolin consulted the settled authority of judicial
utterances. He found fourteen different judicial definitions of the
term. As Lockhart and McClure complained, "(N)o one seems to know what
obscenity is. Many writers have discussed the obscene, but few can
agree upon even its essential nature" (Downs, Ed., 1960, 24). It is now
widely recognized that "obscenity" cannot be defined so that it will
mean the same thing to all people all the time, since the boundary
between acceptable and unacceptable sexually explicit expressions is
unclear. Schroeder argues that:
The ethnographic facts, ... show that there is not a single
element of objective nature which is a constituent factor of every
conception of either modesty or obscenity. Thus, ... the only
unifying element common to all conceptions of modesty or of
obscenity must be subjective - must be in the mind of the
contemplating person, not in the thing contemplated (Schroeder,
1911, 259).
He mentions various standards of obscenity. Here are some
examples. As is widely known, Chinese women are offended if they are
compelled to expose their naked feet. Some tribes, who do not mind
wearing only little clothing, believe it indecent to eat in each
other s presence. Based on this belief, even family members of these
tribes turn their backs toward each other while eating. There are
several other tribes in which women cover only their breasts. They
consider it unnecessary to cover those parts of the body which
everybody has been able to see from their birth, but breasts should be
covered because they come later (Schroeder, 1911, 259-60). These
examples are only a part of his observation. As we can see, ten
different imaginations, interpretations, and logics make ten different
acts obscene or modest. Blanshard says;
Defining the word 'obscenity’ in legal terms is something like
estimating the number of angels that can dance on the point of a
pin. It is a matter of imagination and surmise (Downs, Ed., 1960,
185) .
This is true not only when we see things in international scope but
also in one nation. In 1938, there was a case involving Life magazine
which featured an article entitled "The Birth of a Baby." This was an
article, accompanied by stills from a motion picture of the same name,
and two sets of anatomical diagrams, aimed at educating the public to
the avoidable dangers of childbirth. It was dignified and scientific in
writing and illustration. Still, an influential Catholic lay
organization accused this article of being obscene (Ernst and Schwartz,
1964, 114). According to the assumptions and imagination of the people
in the Catholic organization, probably, the article and the pictures
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were intolerably shameful or lewd. D.H. Lawrence, the author of Lady
Chatterley s Lover
,
states that "(W)hat is pornography to one man is
the laughter of genius to another” (Downs, Ed., 1960, 171). The concept
of obscenity keeps changing over time, too. Gellhorn contends that
"obscenity” is a variable and that " ( I ) ts dimensions are fixed in part
by the eye of the individual beholder and in part by a generalized
opinion that shifts with time and place" (Downs, Ed., 1960, 22). This
claim sounds correct. D.H. Lawrence mentioned the fact that Hamlet,
which shocked all the Cromwellian Puritans, shocks nobody today. The
opposite can also be true. This is because the human being is a
constantly changing creature. As a person changes, everything must
change with him or her, including the meanings of the words one uses.
Lawrence argues that "things are not what they seemed, and what’s what
becomes what isn’t, and if we think we know where we are it’s only
because we are so rapidly being translated to somewhere else” (Downs,
Ed., 1960, 171). In the United Kingdom, the Williams Committee in 1979
presented a comment concerning the difficulty in fixing a legally
workable definition of obscenity. The Committee declared that the level
of offensiveness is necessarily something relative to people’s
conception of current reactions. Even if some definite standard is
fixed, such a standard will hardly be valid, since the social reality
will have changed by the time the legislation is enacted (Article 19,
1991, 414).
It is a difficult question how to develop a constitutional
standard when literature dealing with sex is concerned, because
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societies are afraid of the degrading effects of "obscene” materials on
sexual morality. However, if there is no clear definition of
'obscenity", there should not be any punishment or suppression for it.
This is the rule of "due process of law." On this point, Justice
Brennan said in an interview;
1 put sixteen years into that damn obscenity thing. I tried and
tried, and I waffled back and forth, and I finally gave up. If you
cannot define it, you cannot prosecute people for it. ... I
reached the conclusion that every criminal-obscenity statute ...
was necessarily unconstitutional, because it was impossible from
the statute, to define obscenity (Baum, 1992, 153).
It is not very likely that we can find a solid legal basis for
punishing obscenity soon. There are many issues about which all
factions may never find acceptable answers. Among these issues in the
United States are:
1) Does obscenity or pornography do anyone any harm?;
2) Does pornography have a deleterious effect on social morality?;
3) Does the First Amendment, which guarantees free speech, protect
obscenity?; and
4) Can obscenity laws be enforced, using community standards (as
proposed by the Supreme Court) or any other criteria? (Downs and
McCoy, Eds., 1984, 200).
In this thesis, I would like to consider these questions surrounding
the governmental regulation of obscene materials in the U.S. and Japan.
In both countries, this issue has been controversial, but the ways the
two countries have dealt with this issue are different.
In this introductory chapter, I first briefly examine the
significance of freedom of expression for a democracy. The American and
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Japanese constitutional bases for freedom of expression and its limits
will be discussed. The historical development of both freedom of
expression and regulation of obscenity will be traced. I perceive that
the two countries’ differences in dealing with problems surrounding
freedom of expression are due to the differences in general social and
cultural conditions, the rights consciousness of the the citizens, the
status of laws and the judiciary, the value system of the society, and
the perceived relationships between the courts and morality. In
Chapters II and III, I will look at several landmark cases in each
country. The focus of this thesis will be on literary works. In both
the U.S. and Japan, the definition of obscenity has been modified and
liberalized over decades, but the standard is still problematic. In
Chapter II, Roth v. U.S. (1957), Memoirs v. Massachusetts (1966),
Stanley v. Georgia (1969), and Miller v. California (1973) will be
discussed. In Chapter III, I will address the Lady Chat terley case
(1957), the Marquis De Sade case (1969), and the Yojohan case (1980).
Based on the two preceding chapters, in Chapter IV, I will attempt to
clarify the similarities and differences between the U.S. and Japan in
their approaches to obscenity cases. Here, various terms which the
courts use will be examined. These terms include "community standards,"
"prevailing ideas of society," "prurient interest," "patently
offensive," "sense of shame," and the "nonpublic nature of the sex
act." Different theories of regulating obscenity will be addressed in
this chapter. In Chapter V, the concluding chapter, I will examine the
following questions: What is the harm caused by "obscene" materials?;
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What interest is supposed to be protected by regulating "obscene"
materials?; Is the danger posed by "obscene" materials sufficient to
justify the use of judicial power for its regulation? I will also
examine the tension between the power of government and the ideal of
freedom under liberal democracy. In the discussion concerning
obscenity, the judiciaries have often mentioned public morality —
especially sexual morality. However, I question whether or not a state
has the legitimate power to deprive a person of liberty in order to
preserve "morality," and whether it is a legitimate function of a
liberal and democratic government to decide what ideas are moral or
immoral, or pure or impure.
A, Freedom of Expressi on in a Democracy
It is my belief that freedom of expression is one of the most
important elements of a democracy. A democracy is a system of
participation. This ideal, however, can be realized only when everyone
has the right to think, speak, and write freely, and to receive the
information one needs. In a primitive society, a person might be able
to maintain one’s freedom even if one lacks these intellectual rights.
One can secure one’s freedom using physical force. In a civil society,
on the other hand, it is impossible for any individual to secure one’s
freedom without having these intellectual rights. Freedom of
information - the right to seek, receive, and impart information and
ideas - is unique among all the freedoms. It is the guide, the basis,
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and the determinant of all the freedoms. Without freedom of
information, any other freedoms cannot be fully achieved. Also, it is a
freedom very basic to the idea and practice of any democracy, and it is
a very special political right, because it makes the criticism of
government possible and the exchange of ideas possible, without which
there can be no real democracy. It means that the deprivation or
violation of these basic freedoms by the state is a threat to democracy
itself. Moreover, a democracy is a system whose core is tolerance of
diversity among individuals. Under this system, states should not
subjectively deny or promote particular values. In other words, debate
and competition among conflicting views are regarded as positive and
essential. This is another reason why those intellectual freedoms are
crucially important.
B. Constitutional Basis for Freedom of Expression and Limits on It
In the U.S., freedom of speech and of the press are protected by
the First Amendment:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.
In Japan, freedom of speech, press, and all other forms of expression
are guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution which reads:
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Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and
all other forms of expression are guaranteed; 2. No censorship
shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of
communication be violated.
Both provisions read as if freedom of expression in these two
countries were absolute. However, freedom of expression, like other
freedoms, is not unconditionally unlimited. For example, maintenance of
public order, state security, public health, and public morals can
impose limits on the exercise of freedom. The crucial point concerning
restriction of freedom of expression is how to strike a balance between
freedom and these other interests. As Robert Emmet Long points out,
"(T)here are gray areas involving the nation’s moral well-being that
are debatable" (Long, 1990, 44). On morality and individual rights in
the U.S., Richard Stengel points out that there has been a tension
"between the pursuit of individual liberty and the quest for Puritan
righteousness, between Benjamin Franklin’s open road of individualism
and Jonathan Edwards’ Great Awaking of moral fervor" (Long, 1990, 46).
There are many unanswered questions concerning this balance:
What is the role of the state in enforcing the morality of its
citizenry? How far should government go in regulating private
conduct? Is morality a question of individual rights? Or should
the state play an active role in nurturing values deemed worthy by
the community? (Long, 1990, 46).
The proliferation of obscenity and pornography has long been
controversial, because regulation of obscenity embraces the questions
concerning this balance between the pursuit of individual liberty and
maintenance of morality.
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c. Freedom of Expression and Regulation of Obscenity in Japan
Despite the fact that post-war Japan adopted a Constitution which
was based on the American idea of democracy, and that the
constitutional presuppositions with respect to the individual’s rights
are the same in the two countries, people’s perceptions of freedom of
expression appear to be different in these two societies. I believe
that the function of freedom of expression is determined not only by
law but also by society. Freedom of expression in Japan, as compared
with that in the U.S., will be an interesting case study of the legal
and social limits of tolerance.
the Japanese Constitution of 1949 guarantees freedom of
expression, but over the years the courts have endorsed limitations in
cases where free expression has come into conflict with the government.
Although Article 21 of the Constitution states that no censorship shall
be maintained, the Supreme Court approved censorship of materials
imported into Japan and a comprehensive system for the censorship of
school textbooks by the Ministry of Education (Article 19, 1991, 178).
In fact, freedom of expression in Japan has been restricted by both
formal and informal means. For example, there exist such taboos as
criticism of the Emperor and royal family and of the relationship
between organized crime, the police and politicians. Criticism of the
U.S. military has been a taboo, also (Article 19, 1991, 178-9). As
Article 19 pointed out, there is no press law in Japan. Instead, the
media is largely self-regulating:
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There is widespread self-censorship due to a variety of informal
pressures: the traditions of the Japanese people; influence
exerted by owners, advertisers and government officials; and
occasional violence against journalists and others targeted by-
extreme political groups (Article 19, 1991, 178).
In Japan, the first state concern with allegedly immoral
expression is found in an ordinance issued in 1722. The first national
law aimed at regulating expression for the maintainance of public
morality was the press ordinance of 1869. This ordinance was revised in
1873 and 1875. In 1875, the penalty for translating and publishing
materials disturbing public order and morality was prescribed for the
first time. It was Article 259 of the Criminal Code of 1880 which
introduced the legal notion of "obscenity" (Shimizu, 1970, 175-178).
Currently, the regulation of obscene materials is prescribed in Article
175 of the Criminal Code which was originally enacted in 1907. It
reads
:
A person who distributes or sells an obscene writing, picture, or
other object or who publicly displays the same, shall be punished
with imprisonment at forced labor for not more than two years or a
fine of not more than 5,000 yen or a minor fine. The same applies
to a person who possesses the same for the purpose of sale.
The constitutionality of Article 175 has been questioned by scholars,
on grounds that it improperly punishes expression that is not clearly
dangerous to society, and that it does not clearly enough distinguish
between obscene and unobjectionable material (Beer, 1984, 337). In
addition to this provision, there are such laws regulating obscenity as
the Customs Standards Law, the Entertainment Facilities Law, the Law-
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Regulating Businesses Affecting Public Morals, the Radio Law, the
Broadcast Law, the Prison Law, and thirty-nine local youth protection
ordinances. These are supplemented by a host of self-regulatory codes
administered by various industry ethics committees. In the many laws,
ministry and industry standards, the stress is on the regulation of
material disturbing to "good morals and manners" (Beer, 1984. 337). One
of the most controversial issues is the Custom Standards Law. Despite
the prohibition of censorship prescribed in Article 21 of the
Constitution, Article 21 of the Custom Standards Law of 1910 legalizes
a censorship function over the import of "written material and pictures
harmful to public order and public morals" (Beer, 1984, 337).
In 1951, obscenity was legally defined as an expression which
"wantonly stimulates or arouses sexual desire, or offends the normal
sense of sexual modesty (i.e., sense of shame) of ordinary persons, and
is contrary to proper ideas of sexual morality" (Maki, 1964, 7). There
are three landmark obscenity cases in Japan. I will take a look at
these three cases in Chapter III; the Lady Chatterley ’s Lover decision
(1957), the Marquis de Sade decision (1969), and the Yojohan decision
(1980). The Japanese Supreme Court has used terms such as "sense of
shame" and "the nonpublic nature of the sex act" that have never been
used by the U.S. Supreme Court. In my opinion, these words reflect
something very peculiar to Japanese culture. The standard of obscenity-
in the Japanese Supreme Court has been "the prevailing ideas of
society," which is not the sum of the idea of individuals but something
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the courts can determine. The Japanese Supreme Court has consistently
emphasized its clinical role 1 ' in guarding morality.
One basic difference between the U.S. Supreme Court and the
Japanese Supreme Court is the fact that the Japanese Supreme Court had
no role in creating the concept of freedom, establishing the basic
rules governing the relation between the state and the people, or in
defining the nature of specific freedoms (Maki, 1964, 41 in
Introduction), this is because the American occupation authority
reformed the Japanese judicial and legal system comprehensively after
World War II, and because Japan imported the concept of democratic
freedom from the U.S. Maki argues that the role of the Japanese Supreme
Court has been in the reconciliation of the doctrine of the public
welfare with the guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms (Maki,
1964, 41 in Introduction).
Pre-war Japan had been highly intolerant of freedom of expression,
largely because of its group-oriented social norms. The Japanese have
been traditionally reticent and suspicious about assertions of
individual rights. Very often, assertion of individual rights can be
taken negatively. Similarly, to manifest unorthodoxy or disagreement
can be taken just as egocentric. Nakane Chie, in her prominent study of
Japanese society, points out that a man will find himself opposed on
any issue and ruled out by majority opinion, once he has been labelled
as one whose opinions are contrary to those of the group (Nakane, 1970,
33-5). She also argues that an individual, however able, however strong
his personality and high his status, has to compromise with his group's
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decision, which then develops a life of its own (Nakane, 1970, 150). As
Nakane found, Japan is a society which is heavily based on compromise,
consensus, and harmony. Even after the modernization and the
comprehensive constitutional and judicial reform by the occupational
authority, stress on group consensus rather than on individualism has
remained. Beer described democracy in Japan as "communitarian feudal
democracy" (Ishida and Kraus, Eds., 1989, 85).
Democratic notions of constitutionalism, individual rights, and
freedom derived from varied Western sources also became widely
known in Japan in the latter decades of the last century, but
remained subordinate and suspect (Ishida and Kraus., Eds 1989
67) .
An individualistic rights-consciousness
,
which is a basis for American
democracy, appears to be innately incompatible with the Japanese
people’s manner of thinking and social norms. This tradition makes
freedom of expression work differently in Japan as compared with the
U.S. The "public welfare doctrine," which is intimately connected to
the "communitarian" characteristic of Japanese culture, has played a
very influential role in judicial decisions dealing with freedom of
expression. It may be said that, because of such a doctrine, Japan is
more restrictive with respect to freedom of expression.
D. Freedom of Expression and Regulation of Obscenity in the U.S.
It was only after the unlicensed publication in 1644 of John
Milton’s Areopagitica that freedom of information became a part of the
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English tradition. The history of freedom of expression in the United
States is a complex mixture of profound theoretical commitment to
individual liberty and intolerance of dissent and unorthodox views
(Article 19, 1991, 133). In the U.S., freedom of speech had been
guaranteed by the constitutions of some of the states, and in 1791 the
First Amendment to the federal Constitution was adopted. In the case,
Gitlow v. New York (1925), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that freedom of
speech and press was part of the "liberty" that the states may not
abridge. The idea implicit in the First Amendment is that of a
citizenry engaging in robust political debate. However, there are laws
which have restricted freedom of expression including libel, national
security, and obscenity.
Traditionally, American law has used the concept of "obscenity" to
draw the line between prohibited and permitted sexual representations.
The first state obscenity law, proscribing the publication of "lewd or
obscene" material, was enacted in Vermont in 1821; and in
Massachusetts, an unofficial organization, The New England Watch and
Ward Society, kept a constant lookout for possible threats to the
community’s welfare (MacMillan, 1983, 346). A major attempt to restrict
sexually explicit materials in the U.S. arose in the mid-nineteenth
century (Downs and McCoy, 1984, 229). The first reported American
obscenity decision was Commonwealth v. Holmes in Massachusetts
(Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 19). Federal concern with obscenity as
distinct from state concerns, first developed as a result of the
growing circulation of French postcards in the mid-nineteenth century.
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Ihe federal customs law of 1842 barred the importation of "indecent and
obscene prints, paintings, lithographs, engravings and transparencies."
However, the general concern with obscenity in the pre-Civil War period
was low (MacMillan, 1983, 362), and the number of prosecutions before
the Civil War were few (MacMillan, 1983, 347). At this time in U.S.
history, obscenity was not an important issue. Basically, "obscenity"
was not considered an exercise of freedom of expression (Goldman. 1991.
468). After the Civil War, the issue of obscenity started attracting
people’s attention. Anti-obscenity sentiment arose and was generated
mainly by conservative political action groups like the New York
Society for the Suppression of Vice founded by Anthony Comstock, who
during the course of a forty-year campaign sought to purify American
literature under the banner "MORALS, Not Art or Literature" (MacMillan,
1983, 347). For groups like the New York Society for the Suppression of
Vice, the fundamental concern was the decay of morality. These groups
focused on the impact of sexually explicit materials on basic societal
and religious values. They urged regulation of representations of sex
which "might" cause sexual arousal. Their underlying belief was that
any public display of sex was harmful because it would undermine moral
values and would endanger the moral climate in society resulting in the
debasement of sex and marriage.
The Comstock Act (1873) prohibited the importation, carriage by
mail, or interstate commerce of every obscene, lewd, lascivious,
indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance.
"Many states adopted identical or similar ’little Comstock Acts’ of
18
their own and a number of cities and towns followed suit" (Downs and
McCoy, Eds., 1984, 229). Anthony Comstock succeeded in having destroyed
"something over fifty tons of vile books; 28,425 pounds of stereotype
plates for printing such books; 3,984,063 obscene pictures; 16,900
negatives for printing such pictures" (Charles G. Trumbull, Anthony
Comstock, Fighter (1913) at 239. Quoted in MacMillan, 1983, 347). More
recently, in the 1970s and 1980s, anti-obscenity groups enjoyed
unprecedented growth. Among such groups are, Citizen for Decency-
Through Law (founded in 1957) and Morality in Media (founded in 1962).
The present criteria for obscenity are found in Miller v.
California (1973). The Miller test was a product of almost two decades
of the Supreme Court’s concern with defining obscenity. To see the
changes in the federal obscenity cases in the U.S., I will take a look
at four cases in Chapter II; Roth v. Cr.S.( 1957), Memoirs v.
Massachusetts (1966), Stanley v. Georgia (1969), and Miller v.
California (1973).
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CHAPTER II
CASES IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
A. U.S. Obscenity Law Before 1957
Laws prohibiting the sale and distribution of obscene literature
have existed in the United States since the early part of the
nineteenth century. Until 1957, however, neither those laws nor their
enforcement was taken to implicate the concerns of freedom of speech or
freedom of the press. Obscenity laws were considered to be beyond the
province of the First Amendment; the Supreme Court’s passing statements
to that effect in cases such as Ex Parte Jackson (1878) and Near v.
Minnesota (1931) were merely restatements of settled understandings
(Hall, Ed., 1992, 745). Before Roth, the criteria for obscenity were
based on the test presented in Regina v. Hicklin (1868), whose measure
were on the impact of isolated passages on the susceptible. In United
States v. Kennerley (1913), Judge Learned Hand, in his dissenting
dictum, argued that "(T)o put thought in leash to the average
conscience of the time is perhaps tolerable, but to fetter it by the
necessities of the lowest and least capable seems a fatal policy"
(Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 7). In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942),
the Supreme Court held that obscenity is outside the constitutional
protection, because "such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas" (Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 9). In Butler v.
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Michigan (1956), the Court held a Michigan statute unconstitutional,
which made it a crime to "publish materials tending to incite minors to
violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly tending to the
corruption of the morals of youth..." (Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 5).
This last decision indicated the possibility of the departure from the
Hicklin test.
B. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
1. Facts
Roth v. U.S. was a prosecution under the federal anti-obscenity
statute, Title 18 Section 1461, making it a crime to distribute obscene
matter through the mails. The appellant, Samuel Roth, was a New York
writer and publisher who had been prosecuted in the 1930’s for selling
James Joyce’s Ulysses, Arthur Schnitzler’s Reigen, and Sir Richard
Burton’s translation of The Perfumed Garden. He had himself written
books and articles on travel, religion, and mysticism, and edited
Voltaire’s Philosophical Dictionary.
In 1955, the Federal Government indicted him for distributing some
less illustrious titles - Photo and Body, Good Times, and American
Aphrodite Number Thirteen. In the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, his
conviction was upheld. Roth appealed to the Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari but limited the question on appeal to whether the
Federal Government could under any circumstances punish the publisher
21
or seller of obscenity. The core issue at the Supreme Court was not the
specific book that Roth himself had sold, but whether or not the
Federal Government could legitimately proscribe the most obscene
materials imaginable.
To aid the Court on the last point, the Government submitted to
the Justices sealed exhibits (which Roth’s lawyer never saw) consisting
of the most offensive pictures and publications previously seized and
condemned by the authorites. The use of sealed exhibits in this way was
unprecedented and probably had a substantial effect on the outcome of
the case. Thus, Roth’s lawyers had three serious burdens in the oral
argument
:
(1) they were fighting against a legal rule that had been firmly
established in almost every society from time immemorial;
(2) they were arguing an abstract question of law with no specific
book or publication to put the problem in a practical context; and
(3) they did not know what horrible examples confronted the
Justices as they considered the problem (Friedman, Ed., 1970, 10).
The lawyers therefore chose a compromise strategy which would allow
some government control of obscenity. They argued that individual
states could punish such publications, but the Federal Government could
not. The First Amendment spoke only to the Federal Government, not the
states, and the broad protection of free speech enunciated there must
be literally interpreted (Friedman, Ed., 1970, 9-10).
The primary constitutional question in Roth was "whether the
federal obscenity statute violates the provision of the First
Amendment." The federal obscenity statute provided that;
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Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet,
Picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other publication of an
indecent character; Every written or printed card, letter,
circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of any kind
giving information, directly or indirectly, where, or how, or from
whom, or by what means any of such mentioned matters, articles, or
things may be obtained or made, ... whether sealed or unsealed'
...; is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be
conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any
letter carrier. Whoever knowingly deposits for mailing or
delivery, anything declared by this section to be nonmailable, or
knowingly takes the same from the mails for the purpose of
circulating or disposing thereof, or of aiding in the circulation
or disposition thereof, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both (Grazia, 1969, 290).
There were other questions. One was whether or not this obscenity
statute violates "due process of law". Under the rule of "due process
of law," there must be a clear ground for convicting a crime. In this
sense, the clarity of the obscenity law was questionable. Another
question was whether the States solely have the jurisdiction over
punishing speech and press offensive to decency and morality.
2. Decision: The judgments were affirmed
The decision, which was given on .June 24, 1957, joined two cases:
Roth and another case, Alberts v. California, a state prosecution for
selling obscene publications. In Alberts, the primary question was
"whether the obscenity provisions of the California Penal Code invade
the freedoms of speech and press as they may be incorporated in the
liberty protected from state action by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." The Supreme Court held that the unconditional
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phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every
utterance. Citing Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952), the majority opinion
of the Court argued that obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech.
3. Discussion
Albrecht, the lawyer on behalf of the appellant, argued that
putting limitations on what can be sent by mail is the function not of
the Federal Government but of the states. The reason for this is that
this is an exercise of state police powers. Further, he posed a
question whether a federal criminal statute can punish speech as
speech, even though that speech has no connection with any action of
Congress over which the Federal Government has power or control. His
argument contended that the federal obscenity statute encroaches upon
the powers to punish speech and press which are reserved to the States
by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments was rejected, since obscenity was
held by the majority not to be expression protected by the First
Amendment
.
In Roth, the U.S. Supreme Court held that obscenity is not
expression protected by the First Amendment. The Court argued that
obscenity was outside the protection of speech and press intended by
the First Amendment. It declared that there are two classes of speech;
one class is under the protection of the First Amendment, and the other
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IS not. According to the history of the First Amendment, the Court
claimed, obscenity belongs to the latter.
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance -
unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the
prevailing climate of opinion - have the full protection of the
guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the
limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the
history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as
utterly without redeeming social importance. This rejection for
that reason is mirrored in the universal judgment that obscenity-
should be restrained, reflected in the international agreement of
over 50 nations, in obscenity laws of all the 48 States, and in
the 20 obscenity laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to 1956
(354 U.S. 476, 484-485).
According to the Court’s opinion, the protection by the First Amendment
was "fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people"
(354 U.S. 476, 484) .
Justice Brennan's majority opinion based its conclusion not only-
on history and precedent but also on the view that, although the First
Amendment protects all ideas with even the slightest social importance
no matter how hateful they may be, it does not even cover obscenity
because obscenity is by definition "utterly without redeeming social
importance." By holding that obscenity was to be treated as
constitutionally equivalent to conduct rather than speech, the Court
allowed obscenity regulation to proceed without the necessity of the
kind of showing of particular harm normally required for restrictions
on the kinds of speech covered by the First Amendment. Consequently,
although there have long been debates on the effect of sexually
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explicit material on human conduct, the doctrinal exclusion of
obscenity from First Amendment coverage made it unnecessary for the
Court then (or since) to look at these debates critically (Hall, 1992,
746). Justice Harlan, dissenting in Roth, questioned the majority’s
phrasing "redeeming social importance." He pointed out that the Court
did not indicate the breadth of this term. He asked whether this
category was meant to include entertainment or artistic works which
have little relationship to political or social change (354 U.S. 476,
496-508)
.
The Supreme Court held that obscenity was simply not speech and
therefore could be prohibited. But, the practical problems are how to
define obscenity and how to separate it from protected speech. The
early leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be judged
merely by the depraving and corrupting effect of an isolated excerpt
upon a particularly susceptible audience. This obscenity test was
called the Hicklin test, taken from the English case Regina v. Hicklin
(1868). Some American courts adopted this standard, but later decisions
have rejected it and substituted this test; whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. The
Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon
the most susceptible persons, might well encompass material
legitimately dealing with sex, and so it must be rejected as
unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedom of speech and press. In
the Roth decision, the Court ruled that this traditional test would no
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longer be appropriate. The Court held that a work was obscene only if
taken as a whole" it appealed to the "prurient interest" of "the
average person." In Chapter IV, I will examine the key terms employed
by the Supreme Court in its definition of obscenity.
Even though all of these terms embrace enormous definitional
problems, the substitution of "taken as a whole" for the selected-
excerpts approach and the substitution of "the average person" for the
most susceptible segment of audience (usually taken to be children)
were designed to, and did in fact, remove from the threat of the
obscenity laws most works, even those dealing quite explicitly with
sex, whose goal was to convey ideas rather than sexual stimulation
(Hall, Ed.
, 1992, 746)
.
Jutices Douglas and Black dissented. They believed that neither
the state government nor the Federal Government could punish the sale
or publication of obscene materials. They argued that:
The test by which these convictions were obtained require only the
arousing of sexual thoughts. Yet the arousing of sexual thoughts
and desires happens every day in normal life in dozens of ways...
To allow the State to step in an punish mere speech or publication
that the judge or the jury thinks has an undesirable impact on
thoughts but that is not shown to be a part of unlawful action is
drastically to curtail the First Amendment (354 U.S. 476, 509).
Justices Douglas and Black took a position of protecting society’s
interest in literature, because they believed that the effect of
obscene literature on human conduct should be proven before regulating
expression.
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It was argued that the statutes in these two eases did not provide
reasonably ascertainable standards of guilt and therefore violated the
constitutional requirement of due process. The Supreme Court, however,
held that the lack of precision was not crucially offensive to the
requirement of due process. As long as the statutes were applied in
accordance with the proper standard for judging obscenity, they did not
offend constitutional safeguards against convictions based upon
protected material.
Roth remains important both for having established the doctrinal
foundations for the exclusion of obscenity from the coverage of the
First Amendment and for providing the constitutional basis for the
conclusion that the definition of obscenity must be established
primarily on a First Amendment basis rather than that of the common law
(Hall, Ed., 1992, 746). When Roth was decided, the proponents of free
expression regarded this decision as negative. However, in the long
run, the fact that Roth marked a clear departure from the old Hicklin
test meant a lot. This decision provided a cue to renew traditional
American obscenity law. Roth left several issues unresolved. It did not
clarify what community was to be the basis for contemporary standards.
Another issue was the possible tension between "redeeming social
importance" and appeal to "prurient interest." Whether materials must
evoke perversion, morbidity, or just a normal sexual desire to qualify
as obscene was not made clear (Sunderland, 1974, 51). As Sunderland
points out, Roth can be read as narrowing "obscenity" to a very limited
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group of materials. On the other hand, another reading might indicate a
much more inclusive category (Sunderland, 1974, 51 ).
C. A book named "John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, " G.P.
Putnam’s Sons (Intervenor) v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966)
1. Facts
John Cl el and s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure (otherwise known as
Fanny Hill ) was written and first distributed in England around 1750.
An American edition was published in 1963, and many states immediately
brought obscenity charges against the book. New York State cleared the
work, but both the Massachusetts Superior Court and the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court found it obscene. By a four-to-five vote, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that this book was not
entitled to constitutional protection. Overwhelming evidence of its
literary worth was introduced in the case, and attorney Charles Rembar,
in defending the book, used this testimony to great advantage in oral
argument (Friedman, 1974, 244).
2. Decision: The judgments were reversed
On March 21, 1966 the Supreme Court decided Memoirs. On the same
day, the Court handed down the decision in Ginzburg (383 U.S. 463) and
Mishkin (383 U.S. 502). The judgment legalized Memoirs by a six-to-
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three vote. Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the Court in
which the specific elements of the obscenity test, which the Court set
in Roth v. U.S., were re- formulated
. Justices Warren and Fortas joined
Justice Brennan. Justice Douglas and Black concurred in the result the
Court reached, and reaffirmed their position that the First Amendment
forbids all limits on speech and press. Justice Stewart concurred in
that he was against suppression in all three cases, but he argued that
only hard-core pornography may be suppressed. Justice Harlan again
argued that the First Amendment does not restrict the states the same
way it restricts the national government.
3. Discussion
Before the state court, the sole question was whether Memoirs
satisfied the test of obscenity established in Roth v. United States.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in deciding Memoirs, invoked the definition of
obscenity presented in Roth: "Whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Based on the Roth test,
the Supreme Court argued that the following three elements must
coalesce: it must be established that
(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
a prurient interest in sex;
(b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the description or
representation of sexual matters; and
(c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.
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The point the Supreme Court focused on was the third criterion, that is
the ’redeeming social value" test. After hearing various critics
testified, the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was wrong. The
Massachusetts Supreme Court held the book obscene on the ground that it
satisfied the "prurient interest test" and the "patent offensiveness
test." The U.S. Supreme Court, on the other hand, argued that a book
must meet all of the three tests - including the "redeeming social
value" test - before it is proscribed. Charles Rembar points out that
the Brennan opinion in Memoirs made law of the value theory. The
majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court argued that the
Massachusetts majority was wrong when it held that a book did not have
to be unqualifiedly worthless in order to be suppressed. According to
the Brennan opinion, a book could not be suppressed if it had any
worth, even if the book is prurient and patently offensive. Charles
Rembar, in arguing the publisher of Memoirs ’s case before the Supreme
Court, had urged that if qualified critial opinion held that a book had
literary value, it could not be considered legally obscene according to
the Roth decision (Uewis, 1976, 219). Justice Harlan argued that:
To establish social value in the present case, a number of
acknowledged experts in the field of literature testified that
Fanny Hill held a respectable place in serious writing, and unless
such largely uncontradicted testimony is accepted as decisive it
is very hard to see that the "utterly without redeeming social
value" test has any meaning at all (383 U.S. 413, 459).
Justice Douglas also stated that:
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If there is to be censorship, the wisdom of experts on such
matters as literary merit and historical significance must be
evaluated. On this record, the Court has no choice but to reverse
the judgment of Massachusetts Supreme Court (383 U.S. 413, 427).
Lewis points out that the opinion of critics had sometimes been held to
be admissible in a court hearing, sometimes not, earlier in the
century
:
Even when judges permitted critical reviews or testimony to be
introduced, they generally indicated that such opinions were
considered as limited "aids to the court" (Lewis, 1976, 219).
He says that as the result of a long series of events that culminated
in the Roth decision and its subsequent interpretation, the opinions of
literary authorities indirectly became, for a time at least, the
decisive factor in an obscenity case (Lewis, 1976, 219).
Charles Rembar argued that the meaning of the Memoirs case was
that the decision made writers and their works safe, as long as the
works were something not "utterly without" merit. He claims that
"assuming he can produce something" with merit is "equivalent to
assuming that he is a writer at all." If he has some talent, and if he
is making any effort to use that talent - whatever springs and urges
may have put him (or John Cleland) to work - the law will never bother
him... So far as writers are concerned, there is no longer a law of
obscenity (Rembar, 1968, 490). This is why Charles Rembar gave the
title The End of Obscenity to his book.
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Although no more than three Justices agreed the social-value test, it
uas soon accepted as the official criterion of obscenity (Lewis. 1976,
218) .
Justice White disagreed the view that the redeeming social
importance criterion was a separate test for obscenity. He argued that:
To say that material within the Roth definition of obscenity is
nevertheless not obscene if it has some redeeming social value is
to reject one of the basic propositions of the Roth case - that
such material is not protected because it is inherently and
utterly without social value (383 U.S. 413, 461).
He thought the prevailing opinion in Memoirs to be contrary to the Roth
decision that the character of a book is dependent on its predominant
theme and not on the existence of minor themes of a different nature.
Justice Clark presented his concern with the increasing flow of
pornographic materials, and said that "(T)his book is too much even for
me... There can be no doubt that the whole purpose of the book is to
arouse the prurient interest" (383 U.S. 413, 441-446). Some of the
expert opinions referred to in Justice Clark’s dissenting opinion
indicate that several such criteria were instrumental in establishing
the "social importance" of Memoirs (Sunderland, 1974, 56). Lewis points
out that a contention of Judge Spalding of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court cannot be denied:
The book is composed almost entirely of a series of episodes
involving Lesbianism, voyeurism, prostitution, flagellation,
sexual orgies, masturbation, fellatio, homosexuality, and
defloration (Lewis, 1976, 222).
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Lewis claims that the plot seems an incidental dramatic frame whose
chief purpose is to support the erotic episodes, even though literary
critics testified that the novel does have structure, sharp
characterization, humor, linguistic vigor and style, and some value as
a historical record of its period (Lewis, 1976, 222). Sunderland points
out that the Brennan, Fortas, and Warren opinion in Memoirs enunciated
a test almost diametrically opposed to Hicklin :
In sum, their minority test is this: if an isolated passage of the
material advocates ideas or has literary, scientific, or artistic
value or any other form of importance, then the material is not
''utterly without social value," and therefore is protected
(Sunderland, 1974, 56-7).
Indeed, under the Memoirs test, as long as the work has a minimal
social value, it is protected no matter how "offensive" or how much the
material appeals to "prurient interests." As a result, the materials
which are constitutionally obscene are significantly limited. This
point is the target which was attacked in Miller v. California (1973).
Justice Stewart presented his idea of limiting suppression to hard
-core pornography. His opinion described hard-core pornography as a
class of material in which all of the elements being prurient interest,
patent offensiveness and utter absence of social importance (383 U.S.
463, 499). Charles Rembar described this idea as "an amalgam of all
three tests" (Rembar, 1968, 480). According to this position, the
presence of value would assure First Amendment protection. Justice
Harlan also argued that he would limit suppression of anti-obscenity
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efforts to hard-core pornography, but he limited this argument to the
cases in which the federal government is concerned (383 U.S. 413, 455 -
460) .
The Court’s approach in Memoirs v. Massachusetts was much more
permissive than in the past cases. However, on the same day as this
decision was given, the Supreme Court decided Ginzburg v. United
States, and stated that the methods of advertising and selling the
material would be a determinant of judging the presence or absence of
legal obcenity. This theory of pandering will be addressed in Chapter
IV. In sum. in Memoirs, the focus was shifted from prurience to the
presence or absence of minimal social value. The criteria set in the
Memoirs remained in effect until 1973 when Miller v. California was
decided
.
D. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)
This is one of the last decisions of the Warren Court, and the
Court for the first time gave obscenity some constitutional protection
(Goldman, 1991, 468). In this case, the problem of private possession
was involved. The central question was whether or not a man should be
prosecuted for merely owning or keeping an obscene film in his home if
there was no attempt to sell or distribute it.
1. Facts
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Robert Eli Stanley was under investigation. With a search warrant,
police officers searched his home and looked for evidence of
bookmaking. However, they found little evidence. Instead, they found
three rolls of 8-mm film. After viewing it, police officers seized it
on the ground that it was found obscene, and Stanley was arrested for
possessing obscene material which was illegal under Georgia statute.
Stanley was convicted, and the conviction was affirmed by the Georgia
Supreme Court.
Wesley R. Asinof, the lawyer of the appellant, presented two basic
questions. The first was whether the statute violated the First
Amendment because it punished mere possession of obscene material. The
second was whether the use of language in the statute and in the
indictment to the effect that Stanley reasonably should have known of
the obscene nature of the film permits the state to secure a conviction
for possessing these films without showing actual knowledge on his part
that they were obscene (Friedman, 1970, 309). Asinof ’s argument is that
obscenity in the course of distribution is not protected, but
possession is protected.
2. Decision: The judgments were reversed
The Stanley case produced rare unanimity in the Court. All nine
Justices voted to reverse. Justices Stewart, Brennan, and White did not
address the obscenity issue. These three contended that the material
had been unlawfully seized. The majority opinion, on the other hand,
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was based on the broader ground that possession of obscenity was
protected by the First Amendment. Justice Marshall delivered the
opinion of the Court, which held that:
The First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere private
possession of obscene material a crime... As we have said, the
States retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that power simply
does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the
privacy of his own home (394 U.S. 557, 568).
3. Discussion
Stanley was the first case which conferred constitutional
protection on admittedly obscene materials in a specific and limited
context. The opinion of the Court in Stanley argued that:
It is true that Roth v. United States (354 U.S. 476) does declare,
seemingly without qualification, that obscenity is not protected
by the First Amendment... However, neither Roth nor any subsequent
decision of this Court dealt with the precise problem involved in
the present case... Moreover, none of this Court’s decisions
subsequent to Roth involved prosecution for private possession of
obscene materials... In this context, we do not believe that this
case can be decided simply by citing Roth (394 U.S. 557, 560-563).
Confronting the argument that "prohibition of possession of obscene
materials is a necessary incident to statutory schemes prohibiting
distribution," the Court argued that there is no difficulty in proving
an intent to distribute or in producing evidence of actual
distribution. Moreover, the Court claimed that infringement of the
individual’s right to read or observe what he pleases would not be
justified (394 U.S. 557, 567-568).
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The Court argued that the right to receive information and ideas
is a right fundamental to our society, regardless of their social
worth. To support this proposition, it cited Martin v. City of
Struthers (1943), Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), Lamont v. Postmaster
General (1965), Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), and Winters v. New
York (1948). However, each case is distinguishable from Stanley. Martin
pertained to the receiving of not pornography but religious materials.
In Griswold
,
the material involved was birth control information, which
the courts had never regarded as something without "redeeming social
value." In Pierce, the issue was a statute requiring children to attend
public school. Winters clearly affirmed that "lewd, indecent, obscene,
or profane" materials are subject to control (Sunderland, 1974, 60). In
Stanley, the majority opinion focused on the dimension of "the privacy
of a person’s own home." The Court argued:
He [Stanley] is asserting the right to read or observe what he
pleases - the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional
needs in the privacy of his own home. He is asserting the right to
be free from state inquiry into the contents of his library (394
U.S. 557, 565).
The Court justified its reversal of the judgment by saying;
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has
no business telling a man. sitting alone in his own house, what
books he may read or what films he may watch (394 U.S. 557, 565).
The right to receive information takes on another dimension,
specifically in the context of this case - a prosecution for mere
possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a person's own
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home. The Court argued that the right to be free from unwanted
governmental intrusions into one’s privacy is so foundamental that such
an intrusion is allowed under only very limited circumstances. The
Court cited Justice Brandeis’s dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. U.S.
(1928), in which he spoke of "the right to be let alone." The Court
contended that "(W)hatever may be the justifications for other statutes
regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of
one’s own home" (394 U.S. 557, 565).
In its ruling, Georgia actually denied the appellant’s rights to
satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs. What Georgia contended
was that there are certain types of materials that the individual may
not read or even possess. Georgia justified this assertion by arguing
that the films in the present case are obscene. The U.S. Supreme court
attacked this point by arguing:
Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving
government the power to control men’s minds... And yet, in the
face of these traditional notions of individual liberty, Georgia
asserts the right to protect the individual’s mind from the
effects of obscenity. We are not certain that this argument
amounts to anything more than the assertion that the State has the
right to control the moral content of a person’s thoughts... it is
wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment
(394 U.S. 557, 565-566) .
Georgia asserted that exposure to obscene materials may lead to
deviant sexual behavior or crimes of sexual violence. The U.S. Supreme
Court rejected this assertion by saying that there appears to be little
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empirical basis for that assertion (394 U.S. 557, 566). The Court
noted
:
Given the present state of knowledge, the State may no more
prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that is
may lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession of
chemistry books on the ground that they may lead to the
manufacture of homemade spirits (394 U.S. 557, 567).
There exists a conflict between this aspect of Stanley’s and Roth’s
rejection of the necessity to link obscenity with illegal or deviant
behavior. Roth rejected this necessity because obscenity is outside the
protection of the First Amendment. As Sunderland argues, this conflict
may be reduced by recognizing a distinction between the public nature
of the action involved in Roth (and subsequent obscenity cases) and the
private nature of the action involved in Stanley (Sunderland. 1974,
61). The Court argued:
It is true that in Roth this Court rejected the necessity of
proving that exposure to obscene material would create a clear and
present danger of antisocial conduct or would probably induce its
recipients to such conduct. But that case dealt with public
distribution of obscene materials and such distribution is subject
to different objections. For example, there is always the danger
that obscene material might fall into the hands of children [See
Ginsberg v. New York (1966)], or that it might intrude upon the
sensibilities or privacy of the general public [See Redrup v. New
York (1967)]. No such dangers are present in this case (394 U.S.
557, 567).
What is distinctive in the decision of Stanley was the fact that
the Court decided that the purely private possession in the home of
even legally obscene material could not be punished. Justice Marshall’s
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opinion is unclear about the basis for this conclusion. Under one
interpretation, it is based primarily on the Fourteenth Amendment
restrictions on search and seizure. Under another, it is based on
freedom of speech and the press. Under still another, it is based on a
more broadly premised right of privacy that makes it impermissible for
the state to restrict conduct affecting no one except the actor (Hall,
Ed., 1992, 821-2). Because of its ambiguity, scholars like Sunderland
have criticized Stanley to be "poorly written and neither closely
reasoned nor adequately supported" (Sunderland, 1974, 68).
Stanley was cited by the Court in various occasions. However, the
Court seemed to be careful in extending its implication. In Twelve
Reels of Film (1973), the majority opinion rejected the assertion that
Stanley created a right to acquire or import obscene materials from
another country and restricted Stanley’s application to the explicitly
narrow and precisely delineated privacy right on which that case
rested. The Court also rejected the reasoning that Stanley’s
establishment of the right to possess obscene material in the privacy
of the home "creates a correlative right to receive it, transport it or
distribute it." In U.S. v. Reidel (1971), Justice Harlan expressed the
limited scope of Stanley in this way: Stanley recognized "a right to a
protective zone ensuring the freedom of a man’s inner life, be it rich
or sordid" (Sunderland, 1974, 61). Justice Douglas, on the other hand,
thought Stanley extended protection to the reading of an "obscene" book
on an airline or bus or train, and to transporting such a book in one’s
baggage (Sunderland, 1974, 58). In Osborne v. Ohio (1990), Justice
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Byron White for the Court held Stanley inapplicable to private
possession of child pornography and warned that "Stanley should not be
read too broadly" (Hall, Ed., 1992, 822).
E. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
1. Facts
Marvin Miller owned a mail-order pornographic materials business
in California. He sent the advertisements through the mails. These
advertisements consisted primarily of pictures and drawings explicitly
depicting groups of men and women engaging in a variety of sexual
activities. One of these brochures was brought to the recipients who
had not requested those materials. They complained to the police, and
Miller was prosecuted for violating the California’s criminal obscenity
statute. The primary question addressed by the Court was that of
defining the "standards which must be used to identify obscene material
that a State may regulate without infringing the First Amendment"
(Sunderland, 1974, 8).
2. Decision: Vacated and remanded for further proceedings
Citing Roth v. U.S. and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court
reaffirmed that obscene materials are not protected by the First
Amendment. The Court offered criteria for defining obscenity, which is
now called "the Miller test." Chief Justice Burger delivered the
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opinion of the Court, and was joined by Justices White, Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist. There were dissenting opinions by Justice
Douglas, and by Justice Brennan with whom Justices Stewart and Marshall
joined
.
3. Discussion
In Miller, the Court suggested that the essence of obscenity is
its offensiveness or repulsiveness. One of the most significant parts
was the definition of ''pornography." The definition of pornography-
presented by the Court was 'a portrayal of erotic behavior designed to
arouse sexual excitement." According to the Court in Miller, not every
pornography is "obscene." Besides, not only sexual materials but also
nonsexual materials may be "obscene" (Sunderland, 1974, 8).
Miller was recognized by the Court as a re-examination of
standards from previous obscenity opinions (Sunderland, 1974, 8). The
Court structured guidelines for the determination of obscenity,
guidelines which it characterized as rejecting both the plurality
standard of Memoirs, that materials must be "utterly without redeeming
social value," and the "ambiguous concept of ’social importance’"
(Sunderland, 1974, 9). The criteria set by the Court in Miller were:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community-
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest...;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and
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(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary
artistic, political, or scientific value (413 U.S. 15, 24).
The first criterion, the "prurient interest" test, was from Roth and
Memoirs. The Court confirmed that the work must be judged as a whole.
The meaning of "prurient interest", which was unclear in Roth and
Memoirs, is not evident In Miller, either. The second test, the
"patently offensive" test, is basically the same as the test formulated
in Roth, but modified. To make the decision clearer, two examples of
what may be regulated by the states under this part of the test were
given:
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate
sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of
masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the
genitals (413 U.S. 15, 25)
.
Thus, the Court permits prohibition of specific descriptions of
excretion. On this point, Pilpel argues:
This is really a kind of schizophrenia - presumably specific sex
acts are forbidden because they might be too titillating and lead
to overt and "immoral" behavior; the only comparable fear I can
imagine on which to base the forbidding of specific descriptions
of excretion is that they might lead to too much, or maybe too
little, excretory activity (Downs and McCoy, Eds., 1984, 233).
The Court cited the statutes of Hawaii and Oregon, which it
regarded as acceptably specific provisions. The Court maintained that
the types of materials which may be regulated are confined to a narrow-
category of expressions:
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Inder the holdings announced today, no one will be subject toprosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless
these materials depict or describe patently offensive "hard-core"
sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law
as written or construed (413 U.S. 15, 27).
Therefore, it was clearly declared that the Miller decision grants
constitutional protection to sexual materials unless those materials
are extreme and depict "hard-core sexual conduct." The materials are
protected unless they fall within this narrow class. It should be noted
that the "patent offensiveness" need not be based on the work "taken as
a whole." Apparently, any passages of a "patently offensive" character,
no matter how minor a part of the work they constitute, are sufficient
to meet this test. The Court did not explain why the words "taken as a
whole" are not included in the "patent offensiveness" test (Sunderland,
1974, 14).
The third criterion of the Roth and Memoirs test was changed
significantly. Under the Miller test, "socially redeeming value" of a
material may not be used as a defense against a charge of obscenity.
The Court, in Miller, clearly declared that:
We do not adopt as a constitutional standard the 'utterly without
redeeming social value’ test of Memoirs v. Massachusetts ... That
concept has never commanded the adherence of more than three
Justices at one time (413 U.S. 15, 24).
Under the Miller test, patently offensive work which appeals to
prurient interest must have "serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value" if it is to be saved from being banned as obscene
(Downs and McCoy, Eds., 1984, 232). It seems still to be true that a
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book must fail all three tests to be held obscene. It must appeal to
prurient interest; it must be patently offensive under current
community standards; and it must lack any serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific importance.
In sum, the Miller test considerably narrowed the range of materials
which are constitutionally defined as obscenity.
Justice Douglas presented his dissenting opinion. According to
him, the difficulty of setting the standards of judging obscenity comes
from the fact that "obscenity" is never mentioned in the Constitution;
therefore, it is not a constitutional term. His basic contention is
that the First Amendment does not except obscenity from its protection
(413 U.S. 15, 40). Douglas claimed that the Court has failed in
defining obscenity even though it has worked hard (413 U.S. 15, 37).
We deal with highly emotional, not rational questions. To many the
Song of Solomon is obscene. I do not think we, the judges, were
ever given the constitutional power to make definitions of
obscenity (413 U.S. 15, 46)
He argued that the people should debate and decide what they want to
ban as obscene and what standards they want the legislature and the
courts to apply, and that the courts should use these opinions as
guidelines
.
Four judges - Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall -
disagreed entirely and agreed with each other that "there should be no
ban on obscenity addressed to adults in private." The underlying belief
was that the First and Fourteenth Amendments both prohibit the
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government from suppressing materials even if such materials have
"obscene" contents. They contended that this is especially true when
distribution of materials involves only consenting adults. The
dissenting judges contended that the net result of the majority’s
holding is an almost complete negation of the right established in the
Stanley case to enjoy obscenity in private. However, the action
involved in Stanley was private while Miller involved action which was
public
.
The prurient interest' test and the "patently offensive" test
were used in Roth and Memoirs. In these previous decisions, it was held
that these tests should be applied in relationship to "contemporary
community standards." However, it had not been clarified what the
"community" means. The Miller decision rejected the national community
as a basis for the tests. The Court argued that requiring a State to
show violation of a national "community standard" would be futile. This
is because the U.S. is "simply too big and too diverse" for the Court
to reasonably expect that such standards could be articulated for all
50 States in a single formulation (413 U.S. 15, 30). The Court pointed
out the fact that both the prosecution and the defense, during the
trial, assumed that the relevant "community standards" in making the
factual determination of obscenity were those of the State of
California, not some hypothetical standard of the entire United States
of America (413 U.S. 15, 31). In conclusion, it was clearly stated
that
:
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Obscenity is to be determined by applying "contemporary
standards" not "national standards" (413 U.S. 15, 37 )
community
The Miller decision, of course, reflects its precedents. For
example, the Court reaffirmed Roth’s thesis that obscenity is outside
the protection of the First Amendment. This contention has not changed
at all. The Court also followed the Memoirs test, in that it basically
kept relying on both the "prurient interest" and the "patent
offensiveness" tests as criteria. As I mentioned, the third test of
Memoirs i*as modified substantially. Compared to previous obscenity
decisions, the Miller decision was less ambiguous. The Court declared
that the regulation should be limited to materials depiciting "hard-
core sexual conduct."
Seven years before Miller, in Memoirs (1966), the Supreme Court
presented significantly permissive standards for the regulation of
obscenity. In 1970, the President’s Commission on Obscenity and
Pornography ("The Johnson Commission") presented its report that found
no evidence of a causal link between obscene materials and crime,
sexual deviancy, or juvenile delinquency. The Commission issued a
recommendation that "federal, state, and local legislation should not
seek to interfere with the rights of adults who wish to do so to read,
obtain, or view explicit sexual material" (The Obscenity Report, 1971,
99). American society was becoming increasingly permissive toward
sexual expression during the 1960s and 1970s. It is widely known that
"(B)ooks and magazines with words and photographs devoted in whole or
48
a greater rate since the
part to sex and nudity have proliferated at
1950s" (Sobel, Ed., 1979, 3). On this social change, Sobel argues
Many Americans have already noted the changes over the past twodecades that have brought pornography up from under the counters
of a few furtive newspaper vendors to favored positions in many
news stalls, from the clandestine productions of stag-party
impresarios to the seriously reviewed offerings of the
legitimate" theater, from the sleazy depictions of sex adventures
filmed hastily in somebody’s apartment to fully professional
cinematic works produced and directed by motion picture luminaries
and with serious actors appearing in the omnipresent "nude scene"
(Sobel, Ed., 1979, 1).
Major growth of the pornography industry occurred during this time. The
number of pornographic magazines available at the newsstands grew from
zero in 1953 to forty in 1977. Sales of pornographic films in Los
Angeles alone grew from S15 million in 1969 to S85 million in 1976
(Lederer, Ed., 1980, 41). In this sense, 1973 was in the middle of a
time when the commercial exploitation of obscenity was expanding. In
its five obscenity decisions of June 1973, the Burger Court sought to
redress the balance by empowering local communities to make their own
quality-of-life decision concerning sexually oriented materials.
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CHAPTER III
CASES IN THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT
A, The Lady Chatterley’s Lover Decision (1957)
Koyama et al. v. Japan, 11 Keishu No. 3-997
1. Facts
Ito Hitoshi, who was a prominent novelist, and Koyama Kyujiro were
charged with violating Article 175 of the Criminal Code by translating
and publishing D.H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover. The two-part
unexpurgated translation sold well, with about 80,000 copies of the
first volume and 70,000 copies of the second marketed in the spring and
early summer of 1950. Many authors and newspapers were critical of the
general distribution of the unexpurgated edition but joined the Japan
P.E.N. Club and the Association of Literary Writers in protesting the
indictment. In an unusual procedure, the court of first instance, at
the request of both defense and prosecution, allowed the testimony of
twenty-four amateur and professional witnesses as to the alleged
obscenity of the book (Maki, 1964, 3; Beer, 1984, 348).
On January 28. 1952, the Tokyo District Court held the work as a
whole not obscene, though it closely resembled pornography in twelve
places. The translator, Ito, was aquitted. However, Koyama was
convicted on grounds of salacious advertising, and fined (Maki, 1964,
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3). The defense appealed on the ground that the publisher had been
wrongly convicted, and the prosecution appealed on the ground that
translator also should have been found guilty (Maki, 1964, 3). On
December 10, 1952, the Tokyo High Court held that the twelve passages
in Lady Chatterley’s Lover made it obscene. I to was convicted and fined
for having translated and assented to the publication of the book.
Koyama was also fined (Beer, 1984, 348). Both defense and prosecution
appealed to the Supreme Court.
2. Decision: The judgment was affirmed
On March 13, 1957, the Supreme Court quashed the appeals of Ito
and Koyama while reaffirming the obscenity of Lady Chatterley’s Lover
along lines followed in the high court (Beer, 1984, 348). In its
judgment, the Court affirmed the definition of obscenity which was
presented in a precedent decided in 1951.
3. Discussion
In the first part of its ruling, the Supreme Court examined the
literary content and the theme of Lady Chatterley’s Lover. The Court
observed that "(T)he most important themes, which run through the
entire novel, are the primacy of the complete satisfaction of sexual
desire and the philosophy of life that recognizes in love the
perfection of humankind and the significance of human life" (Maki,
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1964, 6). At least, the Court recognized that the central theme of Lady
Chatterley was seriously philosophical. The Court pointed out that
while the author questioned the conventional code, morality and concept
of sex, he was critical of the sexual tendencies in the new age. From
the content of Lady Chatterley and Lawrence’s introduction, the Court
observed that Lawrence advocated a new sexual code and a morality that
respects the harmony and equality of the spirit and the flesh. Based on
such an understanding, the Supreme Court confirmed that Lady Chatterley
LS an artistic work which is inherently different from pornography.
Apparently, the Supreme Court was correct in its interpretation of the
theme of Lady Chatterley
. Further, the Court stated that the judgment
of whether the view advocated by the author should be affirmed is a
question relating to morality, philosophy, religion, and education.
This means that the mere immorality of the idea does not automatically
justify the punishment of the work. The Court argued that "... even
though the conclusion is reached that they are antimoral and
unedifying, it is impossible for that reason alone under existing law
to punish the sale and distribution [of the book]..." (Maki, 1964, 6).
The question before the Court was not whether Lawrence’s idea is
conventional or unconventional, but whether the elements included in
Lady Chatterley "fall within the purview of ’obscene writing’ of
Article 175 of the Criminal Code" (Maki, 1964, 6). On this question,
the Court presented its unique argument:
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the judgment to be made is one involving the interpretation oflaw, namely, that it relates to a legal value judgment and is not
a question of determination of fact (Maki, 1964. 8).
hater, scholars criticized the construction of this argument. The
Supreme Court contended that the judgment as to whether the work itself
falls under the heading of Article 175 of the Criminal Code as an
obscene writing is a problem of the interpretation of law. It is hard
to understand why the judgment of obscenity is not a factual
determination.
On the appeal that the guarantee of freedom of expression in
Article 21 of the Constitution is almost unrestricted, the Court ruled
that the prohibition of obscene literature is compatible with the
"public welfare ( Kokyo no Fukushi)" prescribed by Articles 12 and 13
of the Constitution. The Japanese Supreme Court, in many occasions, has
used the concept of the 'public welfare" to justify limitation on human
rights. Article 12 states:
The freedom and rights guaranteed to the people by this
Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the
people, who shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and
rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the
public
.
Article 13 states:
All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the
extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the
supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental
affairs
.
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According to the Court’s understanding, the sale of obscene writings is
an abuse of Article 21 rights - Freedom of expression {Hyogen no Jiyu)
- and "contains the danger of inducing a disregard for sexual morality
and sexual order" (Beer, 1984, 348). It was held that the aim of law
under Article 12 and 13 of the Constitution is the promotion of the
public welfare," which includes the maintenance of "the minimum
morality" necessary for social order regarding sexuality (Beer, 1984,
348)
.
Counsel Tamaki Shoichi argued that "under the new Constitution,
which prohibits a system of censorship, whether or not there may be a
violation of the 'public welfare’ must be left to the independent
judgment of each person" (Maki, 1964, 14). He also claimed that even if
restriction in the name of the "public welfare" is permissible, the
basis for deciding permissibility must be clear before the fact (Maki,
1964, 13). The Supreme Court responded that the judgment of the
restriction about present case, which was based on the "prevailing
ideas of society ( Shakai Tsunen )
" ,
was not unclear. The Court also
argued that the presence or absence of "an offense against the public
welfare must be determined objectively." It means that this judgment is
"not something that can be entrusted to the independent judgment of
each person" (Maki, 1964, 14).
Counsel Tamaki Naoya argued that such a fundamental human right as
the freedom of expression is "absolutely unrestricted and cannot be
limited even for the public welfare" (Maki, 1964, 14). On this point,
the Court replied that "the abuse of the rights is prohibited by the
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stipulations of Article 12 and 13 of the Constitution” (Maki, 1964.
14). Citing precedents, the Court held that even those fundamental
human rights stand "under restriction for the public welfare," and that
these rights are not absolutely unlimited" (Maki, 1964, 14 ) it
continued that the protection of a sexual code and the maintenance of a
minimum sexual morality are clearly to be considered parts of the
"public welfare." Counsel Masaki Hiroshi contended that the present
book is in conformity with the "public welfare" because it deals with
the problem of sex seriously. The Supreme Court responded that even
though the translation in the present case is sincere and its content
is in accord with the 'public welfare," that does not offset or
dissipate its obscenity.
Counsel Tamaki Shoichi pointed out the prohibition of censorship
and the impossibility of knowing before the fact what is impermissible
in the name of the "public welfare." The Supreme Court’s reply was that
prohibition of prior censorship does not mean the impossibility of
prohibiting the distribution and sale of obscene literature (Maki,
1964, 16). It did not reply to the question concerning the lack of
" fair notice .
"
Despite the opinions questioning the consitutionality of Article
175 of the Criminal Code, the Supreme Court did not find Article 175
unconstitutional at all. As we can see in the above-mentioned argument
presented by the Court, its decision relied heavily on its belief that
the prohibition of obscene literature under Article 175 is in
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conformity with the "public welfare;" therefore, it is constitutional.
The problems of the public welfare doctrine will be addressed later.
In defining obscenity, the court first cited prewar and postwar
precedent. The Court quoted the Great Court of Cassation's definition
of obscenity in a June 10, 1928 decision (Taishin In, Case No. 1928. Re
1465);
It designates writings, pictures, or any other objects which
stimulate or arouse sexual desire or could lead to its
gratification, and, accordingly such obscene objects necessarily
are those that produce the sense of shame or disgust in human
beings (Maki, 1964. 6-7).
I he Court also quoted First Petty Bench decision (the Sande Goraku
decision) in 1951 saying:
. .
.
[obscene matter] is that which wantonly stimulates or arouses
sexual desire or offends the normal sense of sexual modesty of
ordinary persons, and is contrary to proper ideas of sexual
morality (Maki, 1964, 7)
The Court added:
In order for a writing to be obscene, it is required that it
wantonly arouse and stimulate sexual desire, offend the normal
sense of shame, and run counter to proper concepts of sexual
morality (Beer, 1984, 348; Maki, 1964, 7).
It should be noted that the Supreme Court in 1957 unanimously affirmed
the criteria for obscenity which were set in 1951 (Ashibe and
Takahashi, Eds., 1994, 111).
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The Japanese Supreme Court consistently contended that obscene
literature offends the ordinary person’s "Sense of Modesty Regarding
Sex" ( Seiteki Shuchishin; alternatively, "the sense of shame"), which is
a natural consequence of the privacy of sex ( Seikoi hikozen no gensoku
;
or "the nonpublic nature of the sex act") (Beer, 1984. 348-9). The
majority opinion argued:
As a general rule, the possession, irrespective of differences of
civilization, race, clime, and history, of a sense of shame is a
fundamental characteristic that sets man apart from the beasts.
Shame, compassion, and reverence are the most fundamental emotions
that man possesses... These emotions constitute the foundation of
universal morality... The existence of the sense of shame is
especially striking in respect to sexual desire (Maki, 1964, 7).
It was clearly stated that sexual desire itself is not evil, and that
this instinct is a natural aspect of mankind. However, the Court argued
that "human nobility" (Maki, 1964, 7) is conscious of a feeling of
revulsion toward sexual desire, and called this feeling "the sense of
shame," which is something universal. Basically, the Court believes
that the sense of shame, in company with reason, controls the sexual
desire and entire sexual life of human beings. The sense of shame,
according to the Court, is the main emotional factor which has been
contributing to the maintenance of order and morality in respect to
sex
.
Next, the Court extended this argument to explain why obscene
materials are harmful to the society. The Court contended that obscene
material "stimulates and arouses sexual desire and clearly makes known
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the existence of the animal side of man’s
sense of shame” (Maki, 1964, 8). The most
nature," and "it involves the
curious contention is coming:
It paralyzes conscience in respect to matters of human sex- itignores the restraint of reason; it comports itself wildly’and
without restraint; and it contains the danger of inducing adisregard for sexual morality and sexual order (Maki, 1964, 8).
I his part of the reasoning is very slippery and simplistic. It is very-
questionable if mere stimulation of sexual desire "immediately
paralyzes conscience in respect to matters of sex", and leads
individuals to "ignore the restraint of reason." This assertion lacks
credibility. The Court should have presented some reliable evidence of
the causal relationship between obscene materials and decay of sexual
morality.
Justice Mano presented his opinion criticizing the Court’s
reasoning. He claimed that the Supreme Court erred in using such
questionable general norms as the sense of shame and the privacy of
sex. On the "non-public nature of the sex act," he argued that doing
sex in public and describing sex in literature are two totally
different things. He contended that the "non-public nature of the sex
act" signifies no more than that the sex act is not performed in public
(Maki, 1964, 19). As Mano said, "The translation itself cannot perform
the sex act, either publicly or privately" (Maki, 1964, 20). Also, he
pointed out that the description of the sexual scenes in the present
translation does not depict the public performance of the sex act
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(Maki, 1964, 20). As Justice Mano criticized, the Supreme Court
conflated the actual sex act and mere depicition of sex.
Another point Justice Mano picked up was the Court’s contention
that the non-public nature of the sex act is unchangeable and
universal. According to the Court, "while prevailing social ideas vary
with time and place, man’s sense of shame and the privacy of sex are
norms for all but a very few unhealthy societies and individuals"
(Beer, 1984, 349). The Court held that the judgment of the presence or
absence of obscenity must be determined in accordance with "prevailing
ideas of society." By "prevailing ideas of society," the Court meant
"the norms of sound men of good sense" (Beer, 1984, 349). According to
the Court’s understanding, the prevailing ideas of society "are not the
sum of the understanding of separate individuals and are not a mean
value of such understanding; they are a collective understanding that
transcends both" (Maki, 1964, 9). It means that standard is not based
on public opinion or on actual prevailing ideas but on the judiciary’s
understanding. The Supreme Court admitted that "prevailing social
ideas" are constantly changing and require modification. It recognized
especially that the concepts relating to sex have been changing because
of the wider freedom advocated in contemporary society. However, the
majority opinion contradictorily contended that "in every society, it
is recognized that there are norms that must not be overstepped and
that there are norms that must be generally observed" (Maki, 1964, 10).
The Court assigned itself a "clinical role" in maintaining sound
morality. Consequently, if the moral sense of the majority is judged to
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be dulled or changed undesirably, the Court legitimately exercises its
power to correct it. Scholars criticized this claim by the Court which
practically declared that the judgment of what the prevailing ideas are
is under the jurisdiction of judges. Justice Mano questioned the
legitimacy of this contention by the Court. Mano claimed that the
mission of the judge is "to interpret and to apply the law honestly,
dispassionately, and impartially," and that "this is the proper and
most important attitude for the judge to take" (Maki, 1964, 23).
The Court’s arrogation to itself of a clinical role was sharply
criticized by Japanese scholars, and did not appear in the de Sade
decision in 1969. However, the relationship between the courts and
morality has not been completely resolved. Current interpretation of
Article 175 of the Criminal Code is based on the belief that
maintenance of the minimum morality is in the public interest, which
should be protected by the judiciary. In Chatterley
,
the Supreme Court
recognized that law is "not burdened with the duty to maintain all
morality and good customs," but it still argued:
Law incorporates into itself only "the minimum morality," namely,
the morality which alone possesses a considerable significance for
the maintenance for the social order it is designed to achieve.
What each provision of the Criminal Code mentions as a crime is,
in short, something that can be recognized as a type of conduct in
violation of this minimum morality (Maki, 1964, 8).
The Supreme Court in Chatterley took a position that other values
do not mitigate the obscene nature of the work. The Court acknowledged
that Lady Chatterley’s Lover involved serious criticisms of
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industrialization, economics, traditional class-based society, and
human nature. It also clearly declared that the translation of Lady
Chatterley cannot be recognized as pornography. Pornography, according
to the Court's understanding, is what is "largely lacking in artistic
qualities" (Maki, 1964, 11). Lady Chatterley
,
on the other hand, has
significant artistic qualities. However, Lady Chatterley was held to be
obscene because the passages noted disregard the normal sense of shame
and morality by wanton appeal to passion (Beer, 1984, 349). It should
be noted that the Court, in this judgment, focused on the separate
individual passages rather than on the work taken as a whole. The
majority opinion contended that the work’s artistic or literary value
does not reduce the work’s obscene nature. The Court did not compare
the social value and the harm which the work may bring. Under the
Court s logic, it is also impossible to make such a comparison, because
the Court believed that legal and moral judgment is different from and
irrelevant to artistic judgment. Even if Lawrence’s book is a work of
art, the determination of its artistic or literary value is outside the
court’s responsibility.
We cannot approve the principle of the supremacy art, which
emphasizes only the artistic nature of a composition and rejects
criticism from the standpoint of law and morality. Even though a
composition may have high artistic merit, it does not necessarily
follow that its obscene nature is thereby dissipated. Though it be
art, it has no right to present obscene matters publicly. The
artist, too, in the pursuit to his mission must respect both the
sense of shame and moral law and he must not act contrary to the
duties borne by the people at large (Maki, 1964, 11-12).
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To take artistic and literary value into consideration does not
necessarily mean "the principle of the supremacy of art." It is
questionable if it is reasonable to discard an artistic or literary-
work without examining its other social value, when the work’s value is
recognized by the court itself. Such an emphasis on morality seems
rather like "the principle of the supremacy of morality."
The Japanese Supreme Court totally dismissed the argument of the
appeal that the translation in the present case is not obscene because
of the absence of evil intent. It was held that criminal intent was
deemed present, because the appellants knew the twelve passages
existed,' and "were aware of the book’s distribution and sale" (Beer,
1984, 348). The court cited Article 38-3 of the Criminal Code which
reads
:
An ignorance of the law cannot be deemed to constitute a lack of
intention to commit a crime, but punishment may be reduced
according to circumstances (Beer, 1984, 359).
According to the Supreme Court, to establish criminal intent under
Article 175 of the Criminal Code, the recognition by the parties that
the writing is obscene is not required. Also, it was held that
sincerity of publishers is irrelevant to the presence or absence of
obscenity. Later, Koyama confessed what he originally intended in
publishing Lady Chatterley. He said that he, as a publisher, wanted to
disseminate a correct knowledge, thought, and philosophy about sex in
the era when the widespread distribution of gross sexual materials were
going on. He and Ito chose Lady Chatterley, since it was the
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masterpiece of Lawrence who dedicated his life to the questions
surrounding sex (Higuchi, Ed., 1985, 73). The Supreme Court contended
that neither the seriousness of its treatment of the problem of sex nor
the sincerity of the accused should affect the court’s decision. Not
only rejecting the presence or absence of criminal intent, the Court
also refused to take any surrounding context into consideration in
judging the obscenity of Lady Chatterley. In the Tokyo District Court,
it was argued that the selling method of Lady Chatterley made this work
obscene, even though the work itself was not obscene. This theory is
what is called pandering" in the U.S. The Japanese Supreme Court
rejected this theory.
In the Chatterley decision, the focus was on the question; "What
is obscenity?' As the first case in which the constitutionality of
Article 175 and its relationship with Artilce 21 of the Constitution
were argued, this decision meant a lot. Sakamoto summarizes the
significance of Chatterley as follows. First of all, it should be noted
that the Grand Bench of the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the
three criteria for obscenity which were presented in a past case
decided in the Petty Bench six years before. Second is the Supreme
Court’s understanding that the judgment of the degree of sexual
stimulation and offensiveness is not a judgment of facts but a legal
value judgment. Moreover, the Court contended that the standard of such
a judgment should be based on "prevailing ideas of society," which do
not mean a sum of the ideas held by each individual. This formulation
is curious. Third, it was clearly held by the Supreme Court that
63
obscenity is against the "public welfare" (Ashibe and Takahashi
,
Eds..
1994, 111 ). The Chatterley decision was criticized by many scholars,
and later cases revised its ruling. In particular, the Court’s
paternalistic stance and underlying legal moralism have been attacked.
Scholars have questioned the legitimacy of the Court’s way of using the
"public welfare” doctrine. Sakamoto argues that the maintenance of
sexual order and minimum sexual morality cannot be regarded as the
"public welfare” (Ashibe and Takahashi, Eds., 1994, 111). Even if the
maintenance of sexual order constitutes the "public welfare," the Court
should have examined whether Article 175 of the Criminal Code is the
least restrictive alternative in pursuing this aim. In Chatterley, the
Court endorsed the constitutionality of Article 175 of the Criminal
Code, just by arguing that Article 175 is a provision to protect a
sound sexual order. In this judgment, the Court failed to distinguish
the regulation of obscene action in public, which is prescribed in
Artice 174 of the Criminal Code, and the regulation of obscene
expression.
B. The Marquis de Sade Decision (1969)
Ishii et al. v. Japan, 23 Keishu No. 10-1239
1. Facts
In 1959 and 1960, an abridged translation (one-third) of Marquis
de Sade’s In Praise of Vice (Akutoku no Sakae) was published in two
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volumes. The second part of this work, The Travels of Juliette
( Juliette no Henreki
) was alleged to contain fourteen obscene
descriptions. Shibusawa Tatsuo, a French specialist translator, and
Ishn Kyoji
,
the publisher, were indicted for the sale (about 2,500
copies) and possession for sale (about 290 copies) of obscene writings
(Beer, 1984, 349).
On October 16, 1962, the Tokyo District Court acquitted the
accused. The court did not mention any Constitutional questions, and
just followed the Chatterley doctrine in noting three conditions for
the establishment of obscenity under Article 175 of the Criminal Code:
1) wanton appeal to sexual passion; 2) offense to the average man’s
sense of shame; and 3) opposition to proper concepts of sexual
morality. The court found The Travels of Juliette not obscene, because
the extremely grotesque and brutal depictions and unreality preclude
fulfillment of the first condition. However, the second and the third
conditions were deemed present. On this decision, the prosecution
argued that the three conditions for establishing obscenity are not
independent from each other, and therefore that the work in question is
obscene since it satisfies the second and the third conditions, and
since it specifically violates "the principle of the nonpublic nature
of the sex act." On November 21, 1963, the Tokyo High Court reversed
the decision of the Tokyo District Court, and held the work to be
obscene. The court rejected the prosecution’s argument that a work is
obscene because it violates "the principle of the nonpublic nature of
the sex act." The basic difference between the district court and the
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high court was that the latter held that all three conditions for
establishing obscenity were met, and fined Shibusawa and Ishii. The
accused appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that this judgment
erred in interpreting and applying Article 175 of the Criminal Code and
violated Articles 21 and 23 of the Constitution in holding In Praise of
Vice to be obscene literature first by differentiating between the
dimensions of obscenity and artistry or intellectuality in a literary
work, and then by making a work the object of criminal action for
obscenity under Article 175 of the Criminal Code even if it is of high
artistic and intellectual value (Ito and Beer, 1978, 184).
2. Decision: The judgment was affirmed
On October 15, 1969, the Supreme Court quashed the appeal in an
eight-to- five decision. The Court maintained the position taken in the
Chatterley decision, which basically held that a work can be judged as
obscene even if it contains artistic or other values, and that the
regulation of obscenity is compatible with the "public welfare" of the
nation.
3. Discussion
Just like the Court in Chatterley twelve years before, the Supreme
Court held that the moral and legal dimensions are distinct from the
artistic and intellectual dimensions of a literary work, and argued
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that the court’s responsibility is "not to pass judgment on the
presence or absence of its artistic and intellectual merits in
themselves" (Ito and Beer, 1978, 185). It declared that the task of the
courts is to determine the presence or absence of obscenity solely in
the legal sense. An argument existed which contended that "in
determining the presence or absence of a crime of obscenity, legal
interests damaged by obscenity in a written work should be balanced
against its public benefits as an artistic intellectual writing, on
analogy with a legal principle used in relation to crimes of
defamation" (Ito and Beer, 1978, 185). The Court clearly rejected this
theory. The Supreme Court contended that "it is not impossible to
consider obscenity and artistry or ideas as distinct dimensions of a
work and to judge obscene in its moral and legal aspects a work that is
artistic and intellectual" (Ito and Beer, 1978, 184). This means that
it is possible for a work to be held artistic and obscene at the same
time. In this part of the reasoning, the Court followed the the logic
of the Chatterley decision. The Court rejected the arguments which hold
that "works with artistic and intellectual value cannot be liable to
punishment as obscene writings" (Ito and Beer. 1978, 184).
What was new in the de Sade decision was that the Court recognized
the possibility that the artistic or intellectual elements of the work
affect the degree of obscenity. The key passage in the majority’s
reasoning was:
There may be cases where the artistry and intellectual content of
a work may diminish and moderate the sexual stimulus caused by its
67
portrayal of sex to a degree less than that which is the object ofpunishment in the Criminal Code, so as to negate the work’s'
obscenity; but as long as obscenity is not thus negated, even a
work with artistic and intellectual values cannot escape treatment
as obscene writing ( I to and Beer, 1978, 184-5; Beer, 1984. 350).
In its decision, the Supreme Court clearly declared that freedom
of expression under Article 21 and academic freedom under Article 23 of
the Constitution are "extremely important as foundations of democracy"
(Ito and Beer, 1978, 186), but it followed the Chatterley decision’s
understanding of the limitation on these freedoms. The Court argued
that these freedoms are not absolute or without limits, that their
abuse is forbidden, and that they are placed under limitations for the
"public welfare." Therefore, the Court claimed that penalizing the
distribution and sale of artistic obscene writings for a sound social
order is not contrary to Article 21 or 23 of the Constitution. Rather,
the Court held that it would be beneficial to "uphold order and healthy
customs in sexual life" (Ito and Beer, 1978, 186), which is part of the
"public welfare" of the whole nation. This argument is identical with
that in Chatterley. The Court argued for the maintenance of a sound
sexual order, but it never discussed the question of "whether or not a
certain degree or frequency of exposure to obscene material has any
positive or negative empirical relationship to such matters as sex
crime rates or the development of respect for the dignity and beauty of
human sexuality" (Beer, 1984, 353).
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Justice Irokawa agreed with the majority opinion in that freedom
of expression is necessarily limited in several cases. However, he
contended that:
Ue must strictly avoid an attitude which casually uses the
abstract notion of the public welfare and cuts down on freedom of
expression with great dispatch (Ito and Beer, 1978, 214).
This argument was a solid criticism of the majority opinion, which made
no reference to what the public welfare is in this case. Another
criticism was presented by Justice Tanaka, who argued:
The majority’s definition of obscenity is acceptable, if degrees
of obscenity and the relativity of the "ordinary person standard"
are recognized; but the court’s customary way of interpreting the
public welfare and freedom is fundamentally in error (Ito and
Beer, 1978, 214; Beer, 1984, 351).
The Supreme Court held, as had the original judgment, that
"fourteen passages in Juliette are too boldly candid in portraying
sexual conduct, are lacking in human feeling, unrealistic, fanciful,
and are joined with scenes of ugly brutality" (Beer, 1984, 350). The
Court acknowledged that Juliette is different from pornography because
of these characteristics and its intent, but held that "it suffices
wantonly to stimulate and arouse sexual passion in the ordinary person"
(Ito and Beer, 1978, 186). Therefore, Juliette was found obscene.
In the Tokyo High Court, it was held that if there is one obscene
part in a work, that part makes the work as a whole obscene. In
determining the presence or absence of obscenity, the Supreme Court
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argued that individual passages must be judged not in isolation but in
relation to the whole work of which they are integral parts. It should
be noted that this argument was something that could not be found in
the Chatter ley decision. However, the Court also argued that:
There is no reason to consider it improper to judge the presence
or absence of obscenity in a specific passage when that judgment
is made in connection with the whole work (Ito and Beer, 1978,
Based on this logic, the Court held the entire book obscene since
fourteen sections of Juliette are obscene (Beer, 1984, 350).
Chief Justice Yokota questioned the obscenity of the work, in his
dissenting opinion which was concurred in by Justice Osumi. Yokota
argued that the fourteen passages in question are "weak in obscene
emotion" (Ito and Beer, 1978, 198):
The obscenity of the fourteen passages (10 percent of the book),
which graphically portray debauchery, sodomy, bestiality, and
unnatural love, is diminished beyond the critical point by
contiguous sections depicting such behavior as flagellation,
torture, and killing by fire, as well as by the sharp social
criticism and ideas of the rest of the book (Beer, 1984, 351).
Just like Justice Yokota, Justice Tanaka did not find the work in
question obscene, because "its contents are generally vacuous,
unrealistic, and abnormal, they are portrayed as continuous with cruel
and revolting scenes before and after, and they give rise to a strong
sense of loathing in the general reader rather than to obscene
feelings" (Ito and Beer, 1978, 210). Because of these portrayals,
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Tanaka claimed, its obscenity is diminished significantly. Justice
Irokawa also claimed that a thorough reading of Juliette might
literally sicken, rather than sexually stimulate, the general reader
(Beer, 1984, 351).
On the other hand, Justice Okuno, in his dissenting opinion,
argued that the obscenity of Juliette was fostered, rather than
diminished or erased, by the relationship between the fourteen passages
and the scenes of brutality (Ito and Beer, 1978, 201).
The Supreme Court rejected the contention that the book’s effect
on readers should be considered. In its judgment, the Court argued that
under present law, the judges are charged not with assessing readers’
impressions of the book at issue but with determining whether or not a
work is possessed of obscenity, according to the "prevailing ideas of
society, man’s sense of shame, and the privacy of sex" (Ito and Beer,
1978, 188; Beer, 1984). According to the Court, the impression of the
general reader is nothing more than just a reference. Just like the
Court in the Chatterley decision, the Court placed the standard of
judgment on the "prevailing ideas of society." However, the normative
characteristic of the "prevailing ideas of society," which was
presented in Chatterley, was not very evident in the de Sade decision.
The appellants contended that facts of such matters as the methods
of publishing and selling writings, and the scope, the degree and the
classes of people in the readership, the attitude of authors, and other
matters forming the premises for judgment concerning the obscenity of
the work were not investigated. Therefore, they argued that "the
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judgment concerning obscenity is not based on lawful evidence and does
not follow proper procedures, and thus violates Articles 31 and 37 of
the Constitution" (Ito and Beer, 1978. 189). The Supreme Court replied
to this argument by saying that the Court 'does not adopt a position
based on a relativistic notion of obscenity in judging obscenity in
this case" (Ito and Beer, 1978, 189). The Court also argued that this
case is an instance "in which the judgment of first instance
established the existence of the facts constituting the crime" (Ito and
Beer, 1978, 189), and that the Supreme Court in such a case does not
need further fact-finding to hold a judgment.
Justice Tanaka pointed out that the majority in the present case
seems to acknowlege the relativity of the concept of obscenity by
saying that "the literary and intellectual content of a book may
diminish its obscene effects to a point where illegal obscenity is not
present. This argument was what the Chattarley decision rejected.
However, the Court rejected the relativity of societal values and the
role of literary values in judicial determinations regarding obscenity.
Justice Tanaka claimed that the Court’s position on this point is
confused and ambiguous (Ito and Beer, 1978, 206-10; Beer, 1984, 352).
The effect on an obscenity judgment of salacious advertising was
not clear from the majority opinions in de Sade (Beer, 1984, 353).
Moreover, the question of protection of youth was argued only in
Justice Iwata’s opinion (Beer, 1984, 353). Justice Irokawa argued that
examination of surrounding circumstances such as the method of
publication, distribution, and sales, the format of the printing, and
72
the methods of promotion and advertising is necessary. In his
dissenting opinion, he claimed that:
t is reasonable to regulate salacious advertising, or publication
of obscene extracts from a work otherwise recognized for its
social value (Ito and Beer, 1978, 215; Beer, 1984, 351).
There were six separate opinions. Each of them had distinctive
elements, but one similarity between them was that each one proposed to
judge obscenity by taking other values into consideration.
Justice Iwata, who presented a separate opinion, agreed with the
conclusion of the majority opinion that artistically, intellectually,
or academically valuable works can be judged obscene at the same time.
He acknowledged the obscenity of the fourteen passages in question, and
agreed with the majority in that Juliette is obscene under Article 175
of the Criminal Code. Yet, he contended that it is wrong to make the
distribution, sale, and public display of the works a crime without
examining the methods and manner of their publication, and other
circumstances (Ito and Beer, 1978, 194). Iwata’s opinion stressed the
academic, historical, scientific, intellectual, and/or literary values
of Juliette
. He contended that the proper interpretive method was to
balance the legal benefits of regulating obscenity against the social
values of the work as a whole (Beer, 1984, 351). He proposed the
comparative consideration of the legal interests:
When the benefit to society (public interest) from publication of
those writings is greater than the legal interests infringed upon
due to obscenity, then the publication of those writings for the
sake of that benefit to society (public interest), as a
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justifiable act under Article 35 of the Criminal Code, does not
constitute obscenity (Ito and Beer, 1978, 195).
After pointing out the necessity of examining these conditions,
however, Justice Iwata agreed with the conclusion that the publication
of this book should be penalized under Article 175. He pointed out that
this work was published and sold with the aim of general distribution,
that the fourteen passages in question graphically describe sex scenes
in lewd and concrete detail, and that such a work is "harmful to a
proper sense of modesty regarding sex, and is contrary to healthy
concepts of sexual morality" (Ito and Beer, 1978, 196). His conclusion
was that "the benefits accruing to society from the publication and
sale of this book are not sufficient to compensate completely for the
above harmful effects" (Ito and Beer, 1978, 196).
Justice Yokota stressed the intellectual value of the work by
contending that Marquis de Sade, in this work, speaks "his unique
thought and philosophy concerning the laws of nature, or politics and
religion" (Ito and Beer, 1978, 197). Yokota pointed out that de Sade
attacked both Christian civilization and the enlightenment thought
originated from naive progressivism
. To challenge optimism about human
nature, de Sade tried to reveal the darker sides of human nature and
hidden dimensions of social order, religion, and morals. Further,
Yokota claimed that de Sade’s writings’ "revolutionary ideas and their
utopian ideas continue to be accorded great importance in the field of
the history of social thought, in the area of medical science and
psychology, and in intellectual and artistic movements that emerged in
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the present century, such as surrealism and existentialism" (Ito and
Beer, 1978, 200).
Moreover, Justice Yokota considered it inappropriate to penalize
the acts of the accused, even if the translation of Juliette is
obscene:
Even if a book is obscene, penalties under Article 175 infringe
upon freedom of expression if excision of the obscene sections
detracts from the literary and intellectual value of the whole
work (Ito and Beer, 1978, 198; Beer, 1984, 351).
He proposed to consider the matter of priority in each case. According
to \ okota
,
a problem is "how to adjust the demand that distribution and
other acts regarding obscene writings not be permitted, with the
demands of freedom of expression with respect to writings with
intellectual value and the like" (Ito and Beer, 1978, 199). To
determine the priority, he argued, it is necessary to examine the
degree of obscenity. If a work contains passages with strong obscenity,
priority should be given to the demands of controlling obscenity over
the demands of distributing the work even with artistic and
intellectual values.
If, on balance, the degree of obscenity found, even though not
great, is more important to the substance of a work than its
artistic and thought content, its sale may be restricted (Ito and
Beer, 1978, 199; Beer, 1984, 351).
Justice Yokota complained that the majority opinion undervalues the
demands of freedom of expression under Article 21 of the Constitution.
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As cited already, he contended that the obscenity in this case is weak,
and that "obscene passages in the translation at issue are less
important than the passages with intellectual and artistic value" (Ito
and Beer, 1978, 201,. Therefore, in the present case, he proposed to
give priority to freedom of expression rather than to the demand of
regulating the distribution of the work.
Like the majority and several other judges. Justice Okuno
acknowledged that the obscene, artistic, intellectual, and literary
elements are not always mutually exclusive, and these can be just
different dimensions of one work. Justice Okuno. like Justice Yokota,
proposed comparative consideration of priority over legal interests in
each case. His key contention is as follows:
In such cases, to fix one’s attention only on the aspect of
obscenity in that work, to forbid its publication and sale, and topunish contrary acts, is to deprive people in general of their
right to receive the artistic, intellectual, and literary values
of that work, and to violate the freedom of expression of the
author (Ito and Beer, 1978, 201-2).
He pointed out that, under Article 230-2 of the Criminal Code, libelous
speech may escape punishment if the facts in a case indicate the speech
at issue touches the public interest and was uttered for public
benefit. Okuno contended:
This legal principle is a generally appropriate basis for
Transcending Legal Provisions and Negating Illegality (Chohokiteki
Iho Sokyaku) whenever an alleged offense involves an exercise of
freedom of expression that has public value (Ito and Beer, 1978
202; Beer, 1984, 351).
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He argued that the Supreme Court completely ignored the artistic,
intellectual, and literary value of the work in question, and looked
solely for obscenity without any consideration or judgment of the
work's public nature (Ito and Beer, 1978, 202). Justice Okuno concluded
that punitive measures were inappropriate if the various elements of
Juliette were weighed (ito and Beer, 1978, 201-2; Beer, 351).
Similarly, Justice Tanaka contended that the work is of high artistic
and intellectual value. He also pointed out that it was not found that
the translator and the publisher intended to translate and sell this
work with a specific emphasis on the point of its obscenity (Ito and
Beer, 1978, 210).
It was in de Sade that the "hard-core pornography only" policy was
presented for the first time in the Japanese Supreme Court. In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Irokawa tried to clarify what obscenity is,
and what pornography is. He divided obscene writings into two kinds.
The first is pornographic writings which are "indecent writings for the
sake of indecency intended solely to arouse sexual interest" (Ito and
Beer, 1978, 211) and which have "no redeeming social value" (Ito and
Beer, 1978, 211). The second category is the writings which take "sex
as its subject matter and includes descriptions of sexual activities"
(Ito and Beer, 1978, 211), but does not stand "on the basis of arousing
sensual and lascivious preoccupation and interest" (Ito and Beer, 1978,
211). Justice Irokawa agreed with the prohibition of distribution and
sale of the first category, because pornography "will contribute to the
decay and degradation of a sound order in society regarding sex" (Ito
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and Beer, 1978, 211). Concerning the second category, Irokawa proposed
to take a very careful comparative consideration of the values, because
he recognized a close relationship between a nation’s culture and the
freedom to write, disseminate, and receive literature, ideas, and
information. He argued that we must be extremely cautious about
restricting free speech and free press (Ito and Beer, 1978, 214).
Accordingly, he contended that punitive measures under Article 175 of
the Criminal Code are proper only in the cases of extreme pornography.
Justice Irokawa found that there are portrayals of sexual activities in
this book which are unnecessarily explicit. However, he also argued
that the translation in the present case does not stimulate or arouse
sexual desire, and concluded that it is an error to hold this work to
be obscene (Ito and Beer, 1978, 217).
fhe concept of "freedom to know" was presented by Justice Irokawa
in his dissenting opinion. He contended that freedom of expression
under Article 21 of the Constitution includes freedom of speech and
press, and the freedom to know. Irokawa argued that "freedom of
expression is meaningless without the freedom to read, listen, and
see," and that "the freedom to appreciate a literary work and receive
its values must be fully respected along with the freedom to publish,
distribute, and so on" (Ito and Beer, 1978, 213):
Even if the distribution of such works have some undesirable
affect on the order in society regarding sex, the distribution
should not be penalized under Article 175 of the Criminal Code as
long as there is substantial social value in publishing that work
and letting it be appreciated (Ito and Beer, 1978, 213).
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Justice Tanaka, who dissented from the majority’s judgment,
emphasized the extreme importance of freedom of expression in
democracy. He contended that freedom of expression and academic
freedom are absolute. However, Justice Tanaka clearly acknowledged that
there are intrinsic limitations on these freedoms. He argued that, in
these cases, only "inherent limits ( naizaiteki seiyaku)" on freedom are
intended by the Constitution. It means that the exercise of freedom
must reflect respect for the freedom of others and recognition of the
existence of different individuals’ freedom. According to Tanaka's
opinion, punishment under law for libel or for distribution and sale of
obscene writings should arise only from judicial recognition of acts
that are in themselves contrary to the inherent limits of freedom.
In Chatterley, eleven judges agreed in affirming the original
judgment, and only two judges presented separate opinions. In de Sade,
on the other hand, six judges presented their individual opinions, and
each of them had some distinctive point. This is the most fundamental
difference between these two decisions. This fact itself may mean that
there was a significant change in prevailing ideas of society during a
period of twelve years, with respect to sexual representation. Beer
points out that the fundamental difference between the majority and the
dissenting Justices in de Sade is in the interpretive methodologies
(Beer, 1984, 352). The majority, like the Chatterley court
,
based its
judgment on analytic correlation of Article 175, the public welfare,
prevailing ideas of society, and the fourteen objectionable passages in
Juliette
.
The dissenters and Justice Iwata emphasized the balancing of
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relevant public Interests and direct recourse to the Constitution’s
stress on freedom. The former see obscene parts as casting a shadow
over the whole, while the latter see the possibility of the brightness
of the whole dispelling the shadow cast by the obscene sections.
The ruling by the Supreme Court basically followed the logic
presented in Chatterley, but there were some substantial changes. Beer
points out:
The majority view went beyond Chatterley doctrine in more clearly-
stating that obscene sections render an entire work obscene;
recognizing the possibility of literary writings close to but less
than obscene; applying the public welfare standard to academic
freedom for the first time (Beer, 1984, 350).
As I mentioned already, one more change from Chatterley was that the
Supreme Court in de Sade proposed to judge the work’s obscenity in
relation to the whole work. However, the Court did not present any
concrete method of judging obscenity.
C. The Yojohan Decision (1980)
Nosaka et al. v, Japan and Nakagawa et al. v. Japan, 34 Keishu No. 6-433
1. Facts
In 1972, the story Yojohan Fusuma no Shitabari, which was
supposedly written by the famous writer Nagai Kafu, was printed in July
edition of a magazine Omoshiro Hanbun. In June, 28,458 copies of the
magazine were sold. The publisher, Nakagawa, and the chief editor,
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Nosaka, were accused of illegal distribution of obscene material under
Article 175 of the Criminal Code. Two thirds of this story was occupied
by explicit descriptions of intercourse in a geisha house.
On April 27, 1976, the Tokyo District Court held Yojohan to be
obscene. In its judgment, the court followed the Chatterley doctrine.
The court argued that the sales of such sexually explicit material as
the work in question violate "the principle of the nonpublic nature of
the sex," and that violation of this basic principle also disturbs the
sexual order and the sexual morality of a society. The court affirmed
previous decisions in its understanding of the meaning of "obscenity"
under Article 1/5 of the Criminal Code and the criteria for judging the
presence or absence of obscenity. Three conditions for "negating
illegality
( ihosei sokyaku)
”
were presented:
1) The sincere objective of the work;
2) A legitimate selling method; and
3) The interest which the sale of the material brings to a society
outweighs the harm which was caused by the sale of the material.
However, the court denied "Negating Illegality" in this case (Ashibe
and Takahashi, Eds., 1994, 114). On March 20, 1979, the Tokyo High
Court again affirmed the constitutionality of Article 175 of the
Criminal Code. However, its reasoning was different from the Tokyo
District Court’s decision. The court followed the precedents in the
understanding of the meaning of "obscenity," but it made the standard
and method of judging the presence or absence of obscenity more
concrete. The court set three criteria for obscenity:
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1) Description of the genitals or the sexual acts is bold,
detailed, concrete, and appealing to readers' emotion and
sensation;
2) The dominant effect of the work as a whole appeals to prurientinterests in readers; and
3) According to the prevailing ideas of society, the work isjudged as offensive (Ashibe and Takahashi, Eds., 1994
,
114 ).
As the elements which should be taken into consideration in judging the
dominant effect of the work, the court presented such elements as the
proportion of the work taken up with above mentioned sexual
descriptions, the relationship between such descriptions and the
thought expressed in the work, and the effect of the work’s serious
societal value which may sublimate or overcome the sexual excitement.
I he Tokyo High Court’s ruling did something more than just follow
precedent
. The court proposed a method of judging obscenity which is
more detailed compared to its precedents. The accused appealed to the
Supreme Court, arguing the unconstitutionality of Article 175 of the
Criminal Code (Ashibe and Takahashi, Eds., 1994, 114).
2. Decision: The judgment was affirmed
On November 28, 1980, the Supreme Court held Yojohan to be
obscene. The Court followed three criteria for obscenity set by
Chatterley. The constitutionality of Article 175 in its relation to
Article 21 of the Constitution was affirmed again. The Court reached
this decision just by following the previous two decisions. There was
an argument contending that Article 175 is so vague that it constitutes
82
a violation of Article 31 of the Constitution. The Court rejected this
argument by saying that this article is not unclear. The Supreme Court
agreed with the Tokyo High Court’s decision in that the presence or
absence of obscenity must be judged by assessing the work as a whole.
After examining Yojohan as a whole, the Supreme Court found it to meet
the three criteria for obscenity under Article 175 of the Constitution.
3. Discussion
The Supreme Court in the Yojohan decision basically followed the
formulation set in Chatterley and affirmed in de Sade. The three basic
criteria for obscenity were left intact. However, the Supreme Court in
Yojohan appeared to pursue more clarity and objectiveness in judging
obscenity. This is probably because the Court acknowledged the fact
scholars had criticized Chatterley and de Sade for the vagueness of
their criteria for criminal obscenity.
The fundamental question that the courts must answer in the
present case, the justices held, was whether or not a work "appeals
primarily to prurient interests in readers." In de Sade
,
the Court held
that the judgment of obscenity must be made by assessing a work as a
whole. This argument was presented in de Sade for the first time, but
the de Sade Court did not mention "how" such an assessment should be
made practically. In Yojohan, the Supreme Court presented five elements
which should be examined in determination of the presence or absence of
"appeal to prurient interests." The concept of "prurient interest" was
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not presented at the Supreme Court before Yojohan. Concerning the
elements which should be considered, the Supreme Court followed the
idea presented by the Tokyo High Court.
1.) The relative boldness, detail, and general style of itsdescription of sexual behavior;
2) The proportion of the work taken up with sexual description;
d) The relationship in a literary work between such descriptions
and the intellectual content of the story;
-1) The degree to which artistry and thought content mitigate the
sexual excitement induced by the writing; and
5) The relationship of sexual portrayals to the structure and
unfolding of the story (Beer, 1984, 353).
in de Sade
,
the Supreme Court focused on the theme of the work in
question. In Yojohan, on the other hand, the Court’s focus shifted from
the theme to the descriptions contained in the work.
The Court used the term "prevailing ideas of society," but did not
mention the meaning of this term. The Court simply followed the ruling
made 23 years before, which argued that the "non-public nature of the
sex act" is at the core of prevailing ideas of society. Given the great
transformation of society between 1957 and 1980, the Supreme Court
should have at least addressed this issue. In 1983, Justice Ito
presented his opinion that "prevailing ideas of society" should be
flexibly determined in accordance with social change. With this
argument, Ito rejected the validity of the principle of the "non-public
nature of the sex act" (Ashibe and Takahshi, Eds., 1994, 115). It
should be noted that the arguments discarding the element of "contrary
to proper ideas of sexual morality" can be observed in several lower
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courts recently (Oya, 1981, 60). Moreover, lower courts began
presenting the argument that "prevailing ideas of society’ should
reflect the existing social reality rather than the normative standard
of the judiciary (Oya, 1981, 60 and 62). However, Oya points out that
it is still difficult to judge and establish solid standards reflecting
the social reality. He concludes that "prevailing ideas of society"
cannot be an appropriate standard of judging obscenity (Oya. 1981. 60).
It is observed that both the Tokyo High Court and the Supreme
Court in Yojdhan aimed to limit the regulation of obscenity to "hard-
core pornography" and materials close to this category. Yet, the
precise standard of "hard-core pornography" was not fixed in Yojdhan.
Later, on March 8, 1983, the Supreme Court was faced this question. In
his supplementary opinion, Justice Ito argued that the crucial
criterion for "hard-core pornography" is the absence of any redeeming
social value. On the judgment of obscenity of "pseudo hard-core
pornography," he proposed to examine comparatively the work’s harm and
social value. Also, he claimed that such a comparative examination
needs to be done with a special cautiousness in the cases involving
works with political, academic, or artistic value. However, critics
contend that the harm of sexual expression has not been specified, and
that the social value of the work is not the object of judicial
determination but something the audience should determine (Ashibe and
Takahashi, Eds., 1994, 115). There has been a contention that "it is
easy to distinguish pornography from others, even if it is hard to
define it legally" (Oya, 1981, 62). Another claim often taken for
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granted is that '’there is a consensus on regulating public display of
hard-core pornography" (Oya, 1981, 62). However, to limit the
regulation of obscenity to "hard-core pornography" may not be as easy
as usually assumed.
The 1 ojohan decision loosened the restriction of obscenity, on the
one hand, and made the criteria for Article 175 of the Criminal Code
more concrete and clearer, on the other hand (Oya, 1981, 60). However,
there is disagreement concerning the assessment of this decision.
Scholars like Kitani regard this ruling as important, while other
scholars like Matsui do not evaluate it positively. The latter points
out the fact that the Court did not change the basic definition of or
criteria for obscenity (Oya, 1981, 57 note 2). In Yojohan, the question
of the constitutionality of Article 175 was not discussed at all. The
issue of the "public welfare" was not addressed. The legitimacy of the
selling method was argued at the Tokyo District Court, but it was not a
focus of the decision at the Supreme Court. The criminal intent or
other subjective factors on the side of the writer and publisher were
not examined, either. Largely because it was decided at the Petty Bench
of the Supreme Court, the Yojohan Court was under limitations set by
the previous two decisions at the Grand Bench. In avoiding conflict
with its precedents, the Yojohan decision lacked thoroughness. The
discussion as a whole stayed very shallow. The social transformation
between 1957 and 1980 should have been reflected in the decision or at
least in the discussion at the Supreme Court. It is even strange that
the Supreme Court persistently kept the guidelines which were set more
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than two decades before, as if they were unquestionably correct. Yet
there was some important development in YojShaa. The most significant
advance in this decision was that the Supreme Court made the method of
judging obscenity less ambiguous by presenting the elements which
should be examined in making a judgment.
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CHAPTER IV
THE THEORIES AND STANDARDS OF REGULATING OBSCENITY
In this chapter, I will address the basic theories of regulating
obscenity and the terms used in judicial decisions from the U.S. and
Japan discussed in the last chapter. In the first part, the theories
developed in the U.S. will be addressed. Some of the theories were
employed in Japanese cases, while some others were not. In the second
part, I will examine and compare the standards of obscenity and the
terms used by the American and Japanese courts.
A. Theories
1. The Bad Tendency Test
This test was prevalent in the earlier days of the discussion
concerning the First Amendment. Under this doctrine, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Gitlow v. New York ( 1925) stated;
That a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those
who abuse this freedom [of speech] by utterances inimical to the
public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime,
or disturb the public peace, is not open to question (Emerson,
1963, 50).
In this decision, the Court was practically saying, "the legislature
was entitled to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has
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indled the flame or blazed into conflagration" (Emerson, 1963, 50).
The "bad tendency" test renders freedom of expression nothing, since
freedom of expression receives no protection whenever there is any
confiict between expression and other social interests. The crucial
problem of this test is that it allows only expression which is
harmless to the Establishment. The standard of "bad tendency" can be
ideologically biased. Once such subjectivity is allowed, what comes
next is totalitarianism in the area of expression. The "bad tendency"
test was rejected by the Court in Dennis v. U.S. (1951) (Emerson, 1963,
51 note 6). However, the Court’s wording in Gitlow seems very similar
to the traditional Japanese Court’s argument. In Japan, such an
emphasis on the 'public welfare" and public morals remains prevalent in
the courts, even though it has been criticized by Japanese academics.
2. The Clear and Present Danger Test
The "clear and present danger" test was presented by Justice
Holmes in Schenck v. U.S. (1919):
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent (Emerson, 1963, 51).
Originally, Justice Holmes presented this argument in order to justify
the regulation of expression. Later, however, this test was used to
protect freedom of expression, and has been regarded as an advancement
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from the "bad tendency" test. The "clear and present danger" test
protects expression even though that expression is in conflict with
other social interests. This test was employed by the majority of the
U.S. Supreme Court in the 1940s, and then abandoned by the Court in
Dennls (1951) decislon * According to Emerson, there were five major
objections to this test. First, the "clear and present danger" test’s
focus on effectiveness of the expression in influencing action is
incompatible with the doctrine of free expression under the First
Amendment. Second, this test is very vague. Third, this test often
involves difficult factual judgments which the court is inherently
unable to make. Fourth, the "clear and present danger" test was
originally adopted in the cases where a direct prohibition of
expression by criminal or similar sanctions was involved. It is
questionable if this test is applicable to other kinds of cases. Fifth,
the clear and present danger" test was expanded to include other
factors than the immediate impact of expression in influencing action.
As a result, the difference between the "clear and present danger" test
and the ad hoc balancing test became insignificant (Emerson, 1963, 51-
3). At the beginning of the 1950s, the "clear and present danger" test
was abandoned by the U.S. Supreme Court. Emerson points out that "(T)he
substitute - the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability -
excised the main features of the original test by eliminating or
minimizing the requirement that the danger be immediate and clear"
(Emerson, 1963, 53). In this sense, the "clear and present danger" test
became the "clear and possible danger" test. The "clear and present
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danger" test reemerged as the "clear and imminent danger" test in
Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) and is now a firm part of the First
Amendment law. In Japan, the "clear and present danger' test has been
broadly supported among academics. There are a significant number of
local legislations and judicial decisions which adopted this standard
(Sone, 1985, 22).
3. The Ad Hoc Balancing Test
The ad hoc balancing test is that "the court must in each case
balance the individual and social interest in freedom of expresson
against the social interest sought by the regulation which restricts
expression" (Emerson, 1963, 53-4). This test, presented by Chief
Justice Vinson in American Communication Association v. Douds (1950),
has been adopted by the Supreme Court in a number of subsequent
decisions. Basically, this method does not present a fixed standard of
judgment. Emerson argues that the principal difficulty with this test
is that it frames the issues in a very broad and undefined way, which
is almost unstructured. Therefore, it can hardly be described as a rule
of law (Emerson, 1963, 54). Five major criticisms are as follows.
First, the ad hoc balancing test presents no substantial doctrine which
guides a court in reaching its decision. Second, this test involves
factual determinations which are not only very difficult and time-
consuming but also improper for the judicial process. Third, the ad hoc
balancing test deprives the judiciary of its independent judgment, and
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gives more power to the legislature. Fourth, the ad hoc balancing test
makes the First Amendment insignificant. Under this test, the
restriction of expression is within the legislature’s discretion. The
courts can restrain the legislature only when the judgment itself is
unreasonable. For this, the First Amendment is not necessary, because
the due process clause can achieve the same degree of protection.
Fifth, this test lacks advance notice of the rights essential to be
protected. Ultimate decision is always left to the resolution in each
case (Emerson, 1963, 54-6). The ad hoc balancing test is a product of
the attempt to reconcile the conflicting interests surrounding free
expression. However, this test cannot offer any stable and reliable
legal guideline for regulating expression. Under this test, it is very-
hard for individuals to know whether or not a certain expression is to
be protected, until the expression actually comes up for discussion in
the court. Such unpredictability is a serious defect of this method,
because it lacks "a fair notice.” In the Japanese Supreme Court,
Justice Okuno and Justice Iwata claimed to use this test in the de Sade
decision (1969). Also, the Japanese Supreme Court, in the Hakata
Station Film decision (1969), unanimously agreed to employ this test.
4. The Two-Uevel Theory of Free Speech
In deciding cases involving the First Amendment, the U.S. Supreme
Court has focused on the social utility of expression. In Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire (1942), the Court argued that obscenity falls outside the
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category of speech protected under the First Amendment. What the Court
meant was that there are two categories of speech; one is protected
under the First Amendment, and the other is not. Fifteen years later,
in Roth v. U. 5.(1957)
,
the Court endorsed this theory, it was held that
"(A) 11 ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance -
unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the
prevailing climate of opinion" are protected against governmental
restraint. Obscenity, on the other hand, is "utterly without redeeming
social importance." The Court quoted Chap1insky and concluded that
obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech
or press (315 U.S. 568, 571-572). The majority’s opinion argued that it
is unnecessary to consider the issues behind the phrase "clear and
present danger, since obscenity is not in the area of constitutionally
protected speech. In his article "The Metaphysics of the Law of
Obscenity," Kalven questions the legitimacy of the two-level theory of
free speech as a doctrine, and claims that this theory seems difficult
to accept as a doctrine. He criticizes the Court’s usage of this theory
as "a strained effort to trap a problem" (Kalven, 1960, 10-11).
According to the two-level speech theory, there are two categories of
communications. The communications of the first category are entitled
to be tested under the "clear and present danger" test, even if they
are against majority opinion of the time or hated by majority. On the
other hand, the communications of the second category are so worthless
that no extensive judicial examination is necessary before prohibiting
them (Kalven, 1960, 11). Under this theory, the Court must only decide
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if a work belongs to the first or the second category of speech. Once
the work is judged to belong to the second category, there is no need
for the Court to bother to consider the presence or absence of danger.
The expressions in the second category are to be banned not because
they are dangerous but because they are worthless. On this two- level
theory of free speech, Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion in
R°th, criticized that "(T)he Court seems to assume that ’obscenity’ is
a peculiar genus of ’speech and press,’ which is as distinct,
recognizable, and classifiable as poison ivy is among other plants,"
and pointed out the difficulty in using the two-level theory where
classification at the first or second level depends on a key term as
vague as obscenity (Kalven, 1960, 20).
However, it has not been really proved that certain sexually
explicit materials, which are held "obscene" by the courts, always lack
worth and utility. Kalven says, "In the process of defining obscenity,
the Court said nothing about social worthlessness" (Kalven, 1960, 15).
On this issue of social utility, Kalven contends that the Court "has
confined itself on each occasion to the historical point that libel and
obscenity have long been regarded as worthless speech subjected to
prohibition" (Kalven, 1960, 12). He refers to Gitlow v. New York (1925)
and argues that "the question ... would be about the social utility of
revolutionary speech and not the utility of the particular pamphlet"
(Kalven, 1960, 11). This comment is applicable to sexually explicit
materials, too. Even if the depiction is very unorthodox or even
contrary to the conventional morality, "(I)t is the premises and not
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the conclusion that are worth protecting" (Kalven, i960, ll). in this
sense, the work of de Sade and Lady Chatterley’s Lover
, in Japanese
Supreme Court cases, should have been considered seriously, since their
premises were a serious attack on the conventional moral framework
itself.
For a long time, the courts have asked what the social utility of
obscenity is, and have reached the conclusion that obscenity is
worthless expression. On this point, Kalven claims that the problem
lies in the way the question has been put. He argues:
It seems hardly fair to ask: what is the social utility of
obscenity? Rather the question is: what is the social utility of
excessively candid and explicit discussions of sex? (Kalven 1960
12 )
This criticism is sound. Traditionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has
dismissed certain sexually explicit materials as not worth protecting,
just by saving obscenity lacks redeeming value. However, as Kalven
points out, the real question was "(W)hat is the social utility of
sexually explicit materials?" There are various objectionable exercises
of speech, but it does not immediately mean that they are necessarily
and totally worthless and useless. In this sense, one of Miller '
s
criteria for obscenity - "Taken as a whole, the work lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific values" - should be taken
as an independent requirement. In Japan, such an element as the
artistic and/or literary value of the work was treated as totally
irrelevant to the judgment of presence or absence of obscenity in the
Chatterley decision. In the de Sade decision, the Court admitted the
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possibility that these values make the work exempt from obscenity
charges. In the Yojohan decision, the Court decided to take these
elements into consideration.
However, even if certain expression lacks social utility or
redeeming value, does it automatically mean that it is outside the
protection of the First Amendment? Does expression have to have social
utility or worth in order to be protected by the First Amendment? Under
the two-level speech theory, "(l)„ determining the constitutionality of
any ban on a communication, the first question is whether It belongs to
a category that has any social utility" (Kalven, I960, 11). The First
Amendment itself never mentions social utility as a premise of its
protection.
In his book, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government
(1960), Meiklejohn argues that free speech is indispensable to the
informed citizenry required to make democratic self-government work.
The people need free speech because they vote. As a result, his
argument distinguishes sharply between public and private speech. This
theory explains why communications relevant to the political process
should be guaranteed, but it does not explain why the novel, the poem,
the painting, the drama, or the piece of sculpture falls within the
protection of the First Amendment (Kalven, 1960, 16). Kalven points out
that the majority opinion in Roth has made a major contribution in the
sense it showed a shift from Hicklin. However, he criticizes it as
unsatisfactory, because "it gave a major endorsement to the two-level
theory that may have unhappy repercussions on the protection of free
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speech generally- (Kalven, 1960, 17). David A.J. Richards argues that
attempts to regulate the contents of communications by law are
incompatible with the principle of equal liberty (Richards, 1980, 101
2). According to him, the First Amendment rests on a moral basis that
cannot be reduced to "a utilitarian calculus of the political
usefulness of a debate on divergent points of view" (Richards, 1980,
120 )
.
5. "Constant Obscenity" and "Variable Obscenity"
On the concept of obscenity, there are two basic positions. Here,
the issue is "whether obscenity is an inherent chracteristic of obscene
material, so that material categorized as obscene is always obscene at
all times and places and in all circumstances, or whether obscenity is
a chameleonic quality of material that changes with time, place, and
circumstance" (Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 68). These two
conceptualizations are respectively called "constant obscenity" and
’’variable obscenity." Lockhart and McClure, who question the validity
of the concept of "constant obscenity," find it difficult to draw a
line between non-obscene materials and the material that is obscene
though not hard-core pornography (Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 75). They
pose other questions:
What is to be done about material, indisputably hard-core
pornography, that is addressed to an audience of social scientists
for purely scientific purposes? What, if anything, is to be done
about the panderer who pushes non-obscene material as if it were
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Given the difficulty of fixing a satisfactory test fo r materials which
are placed somewhere between Lady Chatterley’s Lover and hard-core
pornography, they contend that "the United States Supreme Court
of hard core pornography" (Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 76). After they
point out the defects of setting a "constant" concept of obscenity,
Lockhart and McClure advocate a "variable" concept of obscenity, which
would make the validity of censorship depend upon the particular
material’s primary audience and upon the nature of the appeal to that
audience. They argue that, since there is no such thing as inherently
obscene literature, materials must be judged by their appeal to and
effect upon the audience to which they are directed (Clor, 1969, 118).
Lockhart and McClure quote D.H. Lawrence’s words saying "(G)enuine
pornography is almost always underground; it doesn’t come into the
open," and argue that:
Given the nature and appeal of hard-core pornography, it is clear
that the proper hypothetical person to use in testing material of
this kind is not the average or normal person but rather the
sexually immature who wallow in the hard-core pornography to
satisfy their immature craving for erotic daydreams (Lockhart and
McClure, 1960, 74).
might well decide to hold the line for constant obscenity at the level
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inder the concept of variable obscenity, material is judged by its
appeal to and effect upon the audience to which the material is
primarily directed. In this view, material is never inherently obscene;
instead, its obscenity varies with the circumstances of its
dissemination (Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 77). The Supreme Court did
not adopt a concept of variable obscenity in Roth. In Roth
, Justice
Warren argued for the possibility that "(A) wholly different result
might be reached in a different setting" (Lockhart and McClure, 1960,
68), but this argument was ignored. In the Kinsey Institute case (U.S.
v. 31 Photographs
, 1957), a federal district court adopted the concept
of variable obscenity and ruled that hard-core pornography, imported
from abroad by the Kinsey Institute for scientific study, was not
obscene (Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 70). In Japan, the courts adopted
the concept of variable obscenity in some instances. In the de Sade
case (1969), the Tokyo High Court held that when the readers are
limited to a certain group of people, the standard of judging obscenity-
should be placed at the average of that group rather than the average
of the general population. The concept of variable obscenity is not
perfect, either. First of all, it is questionable whether judges and/or
juries can determine the impact of the material on a specific audience.
For example, how can judges know what the readers feel after reading
the material in question? Second, according to this conception of
obscenity, it is unpredictable whether or not a certain expression will
be judged obscene. As a result, there would be chilling effect on
expression.
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6. Pandering
in the debate over the obscenity provisions of the Model Penal
Code, Henry Hart urged that the criminal offense of disseminating
obscene material be defined as pandering to an interest in obscenity.
The American Law Institute rejected Hart’s proposal because of its
difficulty of enforcement (Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 69). The
pandering test, however, was introduced in Ginzburg v. U.S. (1966). The
Supreme Court held that a publication appealing to the public’s
prurient interest in sex and advertised as such may be deemed obscene,
although the material, standing alone, is not obscene under the Roth
test or even under the Memoirs test. Under this theory, a book may be
obscene depending on its prospective purchasers and the method of
distributing and advertising it. Various contexual elements are
considered in determining whether or not a material is obscene (Ringel,
1970. 112-3). This approach was also suggested by Justice Brennan in
Memoirs. In Japan, the Tokyo District Court presented this theory in
the Chatterley case. The court found Lady Chatterley to be close to.
yet different from, pornography. However, the court held that the
salacious way of advertisement made it something akin to pornography.
B. Criteria for Obscenity
Next, I will examine the teminology that both Supreme Courts have
used in their obscenity decisions. Some of the terms are overlapping,
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and some of them sound similar but differ in their actual meaning. I
chose the terms which I think crucial in deciding obscenity cases.
1. "Average,” "Normal,” or "Ordinary” Person
Intil Roth, the standard of obscenity was that held in Regina v.
Iiicklin
( 1868) and determined by the affects on "those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences.” One of the most criticized aspects of
the old Hicklin test for obscenity was its reference to particularly
susceptible persons as the standard for judging material alleged to be
obscene (Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 70). Even though the court
followed the Hicklin test, in U.S. v. Kennerley (1913), Judge Learned
Hand argued that the Hicklin test would "reduce our treatment of sex to
the standard of a child’s library in the supposed interest of a
salacious few” (Kalven, 1960, 6). In this same decision, Judge Learned
Hand said, "I scarcely think ... that society is prepared to accept for
its own limitations those which may perhaps be necessary to the weakest
of its members' (Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 110). This argument was an
indication of the possibility of negating the Hicklin test. In Butler
v. Michigan (1956), "(T)he Court was saying that the average adult is
not merely the preferred test audience for materials distributed
generally; it is the constitutionally required test audience" (Kalven,
1960, 7). In Roth, finally, the Court revised the standard for judging
obscenity. What the Court made clear was that material must be judged
by its effect on the "average" or "normal" person instead of the weak
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and immature. However, it is not clear at all who is average, normal,
or ordinary. In a totalitarian society, the government may set some
arbitrary criteria to define "a normal person." Similarly, in a
theocracy, it was easy to distinguish heretic and deviant. In a liberal
democracy, however, diversity among individuals is supposed to be
respected. Most people think of themselves as normal and average in
modern Japanese and American societies. As a result, it is very-
difficult to say what is normal or abnormal.
Lockhart and McClure argue that any concept of the "average" or
"normal" person cannot be fully satisfactory. The Massachusetts’s
formulation of the "average" person as a composite representing all
elements of society including the young and susceptible retains the
restrictiveness of the Hicklin test (Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 72).
On the other hand, the concept of "average" person as the common man,
or the man in the street is also problematic.
Another question concerning the validity of the "average" person
test concerns the judgment of obscenity in hard-core pornography.
Lockhart and McClure argue that the prurient interest of the "average"
person cannot be the legitimate test of obscenity in the cases of hard-
core pornography, because
hard core pornography appeals to the sexually immature because it
feeds their craving for erotic fantasy; to the normal, sexually
mature person it is repulsive, not attractive (Lockhart and
McClure, 1960, 72).
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Lockhart and McClure conclude that reference to the "average” or normal
person was just an expression of disapproval of the "particularly
susceptible persons" test. As they point out, if the concept of
variable obscenity is accepted, the concept of the average or normal
person has little place (Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 78).
It seems that the U.S. Supreme Court employed the term "according
to contemporary community standards" in order to modify the defects in
the concept of the "average" person. In Japan, the Supreme Court has
used wording similar to "average" person; "the normal sense of sexual
modesty of ordinary persons." The Japanese Supreme Court, on the other
hand, has not added anything to make the concept of "normal" clearer.
Instead, the Court has argued that "the prevailing ideas of society"
should be the criteria of judgment.
2. "Contemporary Community Standards" (the U.S.) and "Prevailing Ideas
of Society" (Japan)
In Roth (1957), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the presence or
absence of obscenity may be judged by the application of "contemporary-
community standards." In Smith v. California (1959), Justice
Frankfurter argued:
The determination of obscenity is for juror or judge, not on the
basis of his personal upbringing or restricted reflection on the
particular experience of life, but on the basis of contemporary
community standards (Ringel, 1970, 96).
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cases as Excellent
The national standards test was adopted in such
Publications Inc. v. U.S.( 1962) and State v. Hudson County News (1963).
In Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964), the Court held that the term
"contemporary community standards" must not be interpreted in a
parochial sense, but is to be equated with the contemporary community
standards of the nation as a whole, since the area of expression that
is protected is governed by the Federal Constitution (Ringel, 1970,
102-3). The logic of the proponents of the national standards test is
that the First Amendment rights must be applied equally to all the
states just because those rights are a part of the Federal
Constitution. The American Law Institute, although a bit ambiguous,
favored national community standard by arguing that "since a large part
of the responsibility in this area has been assumed by the national
government enoforcing federal obscenity legislation, a country-wide
approach is almost unavoidable" (Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 111
footnote 601). In Hudson v. U.S. (1967), the Court held that the term
community' used in Jacobellis refers to the nation as a whole, not to
the local community. The Court argued that the national scale must be
taken because the meaning of the term "obscenity" is not intended to
vary from place to place (Ringel, 1970, 104).
The adoption of a national standards test was criticized, because
it "takes away from the individual states their right to deal with
their local problems. It tends to centralize in the federal government
the power to control criminal prosecutions in the respective states"
(Ringel, 1970, 109). In Wisconsin, in McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer
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(1963), the statewide test was adopted. The California Supreme Court,
in In Re Giannini
( 1968), argued that "(Dn order to provide guidance
in the event of further prosecutions, however, we hold that the trial
judge correctly ruled that the relevant community is the State of
California- (Ringel, 1970, 103). This case, In Re Giannini, however,
was a case which involved "topless" dancing in a nightclub. It was not
a case which involved publication of books or motion pictures.
The most crucial deficiency of the national standard lies in the
fact that its application was almost unworkable, because of diversity
among states across the U.S. This is why it was rejected in Miller v.
California (1973), as we saw in Chapter II. However, focus on a very
narrow geographic area does not necessarily make it easier to find a
standard for obscenity. Douglas Wallace conducted a survey of 1083
adult volunteers from the Detroit Metropolitan Area to find out if
there was a reliable "community standard" for evaluating a series of
erotic pictures. What Wallace found was a considerable amount of
variability in response to both the attitude items and the erotic
stimuli, but he says that this is not a great surprise given the
heterogeneity with respect to age, education, religion, religiosity,
sex and sexual attitudes. Wallace claims:
While it may be possible to find or construct a small group of
individuals who will totally agree with each other in their
evaluation of visual erotica, on the dimensions relevant to the
concept of legal obscenity the probability that such a consensus
will be obtained will decrease in a nonlinear manner as the size
of the group increases linearly (Wallace, 1973, 66).
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Wallace found no uniform standard or criterion being used by subjects
as they evaluated the stimulus items. His findings did not support the
single contemporary community standard hypothesis. He concluded that
the social issue of obscenity ultimately reduces itself to one of
individual differences" (Wallace, 1S73, 67).
Lockhart and McClure conclude that the phrase "contemporary
community standards" have little place in obscenity eases, and that his
wording was used by the Court just to express its disapproval of the
application of the Victorian standards in the Hicklin test (Lockhart
and McClure, 1960
, 113)
.
On the question as to who should determine what is obscene, D.H.
Lawrence contends:
We have to leave everything to the majority, everything to the
majority, everything to the mob, the mob, the mob. They know what
is obscene and what isn’t, they do. If the lower ten million
doesn t know better than the upper ten men, then there’s something
wrong with mathematics. Take a vote on it! Show hands, and prove
it by count! (Downs, Ed., 1960, 171).
Lawrence’s claim points out the basic rule of democracy. In Japan,
however, there appears that "there’s something wrong with mathematics."
In judging obscenity, the Japanese Supreme Court repeatedly held that
such a judgment has to be in accordance with "the prevailing ideas of
society." This term sounds very similar to the term "contemporary-
community standards" in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions, but these
two are different. According to the Japanese Supreme Court’s
understanding, "the prevailing ideas of society" are "not the sum of
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the understanding of separate individuals and are not a mean value of
sueh understanding” (The Chatterle, decision; eited in Maki, 1964. 9).
The Court clearly declared that ”(T)he judgment of what the prevailing
ideas of society are is. under our present system, entrusted to judges"
(Maki, 1964, 9). There is no law which states that such a judgment is
entrusted to judges. The Court’s contention presupposes that judges
surety know what ideas are prevailing among the "mob" in the current
society. It may be assumed that the Japanese Supreme Court is saying
basically that "the upper fifteen men - Justices - know better than the
lower one hundred twenty million." If the upper fifteen men know better
than the lower one hundred twenty million, there is no place for
democracy. This attitude of the Japanese Supreme Court represents the
judiciary's arrogance. Also. I believe that one difference between the
l.S. and Japan shapes the Japanese Court's attitude. What the U.S. has
and Japan does not is a jury system. Judge Learned Hand, in Kennerley
( 1913)
,
claimed that
:
If letters must, like other kinds of conduct, be subject to the
social sense of what is right, it would seem that a jury should in
each case establish the standard much as they do in cases of
negligence (Kalven, 1960, 7).
The jury system is one of the fundamental elements in American
democracy, which promotes and secures the participation of the "mob" in
the legal arena. In Japan, the jury system was abolished in 1943
(Toshitani, 1985, 166). I do not think that a jury system necessarily
makes the better decisions or more just decisions, but the
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participation of the people must make a difference in judgment. This is
especially true when it comes to the issue of obscenity, I do not
believe that fifteen supposedly intelligent and decent judges really
know what ideas about sexual expression are the most prevalent among
Lhe "mob" in the constantly changing society.
3. "Prurient Interest" and "Sexual Arousal"
On the central question; "What is obscenity?," the Supreme Court
m Roth just said that "obscene material is material which deals with
sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest" (Roth, p . 487
; cited in
Lockhart ad McClure, 1960, 55). The term "prurient" is derived from the
Latin word " pruriens" which means "itching", "to long for", "wanton"
(Rmgel, 1970, 93). The concept of "prurient interest" is defined by
the Court in its Roth decision as "having a tendency to excite lustful
thoughts." On such a definition of obscenity, Kalven points out:
The key word "prurient" is defined by one dictionary in terms of
lascivious longings" and "lewd." The obscene, then is that which
appeals to an interest in the obscene (Kalven, 1960, 15).
Similarly, Lockhart and McClure point out that:
The definition of obscenity as sexual material that appeals to
prurient interest, however, merely pushes the central question
back a notch. If obscenity is sexual material that appeals to
prurient interest, what is the appeal to prurient interest that
makes sexual material obscene? What is the essential nature?
(Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 55-6).
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It appears that nobody has ever known, knows, or will know what
constitutes the essential nature of obscenity. This situtation must be
the same in Japan. The Japanese Supreme Court used a tern, which is
similar to "appeal to prurient interest.' In Japan, to be held as
obscene, the material has to "wantonly stimulate and arouse sexual
desire." I can find no substantial difference between "appealing to
prurient interest" and "arousing sexual desire.” If I have to point out
any difference between the U.S. and the Japanese Supreme Courts. I
would point out the wording of the Japanese Court - "wantonly." I do
the word wantonly
-means anything substantial here. This
means just a mood or image. To put such an intangible word in the
criteria for a judgment is very typical of the Japanese courts. How
either the Japanese or the U.S. Supreme Courts can know whether an
expression arouses sexual desire or prurient interest in the readers’
mind remains unanswered. Charles Rembar once said; "Pornography is in
the groin of the beholder" (Time, July 11
, 1969, 39). As previously
mentioned in Chapter 1, what makes the issue of obscenity difficult is
the gap among individuals with respect to what constitutes acceptable
or unacceptable sexual representation. The current "prurient interest"
test is so subjective that it is very questionable as to how such a
capricious test can be applied universally. What stimulates an average
person with "prurient interest" can be nothing to another similarly
average person. What is healthy sex to one average person can be just
disgusting to another. Just as there are different preferences for
foods, there are millions of different standards, tastes, and
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preferences for sex, sexuality, and sexual representation. In addition
to the differences in taste, Ringel points out that age cannot be
overlooked as a factor to be considered in measuring prurient interest
(Ringel, 1970, 99-100).
Another critique points out that it is questionable if government
may seek to control people’s thoughts - whether or not they are lustful
thoughts. Ringel says, "When we speak of ’prurient interest,’ we speak
of what goes on in one's mind" (Ringel, 1970, 100). Even if the courts
choose to seek to curb lustful thoughts, they have another problem in
the practical application of the "prurient interest" test. Lockhart and
McClure question:
If, as the Court seems to say, material that appeals to prurient
interest is material that has a tendency to excite lustful
thoughts, what degree of causal relationship between the material
and the thought is required? (Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 49).
It was not made clear in Roth whether materials must evoke
perversion, morbidity, or a normal sexual desire to qualify as obscene.
Subsequent case law has refined "prurient interest" to "a sick and or
morbid interest in sex." To the American Law Institute, "prurient
interest" is a "shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or
excretion: it is "an exacerbated, morbid, or perverted interest growing
out of the conflict between the universal sexual drive of the
individual and equally universal social controls of sexual activity"
(Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 56). No one, however, seems to know the
essential nature of "prurient interest," the American Law Institute and
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countless judicial opinions notwithstanding. Such a vague term should
not be used as a criterion for legal judgment.
4. "Patently Offensive" and "Offend the Sense of Shame"
In 1954, Lockhart and McClure, in their article "Law of
Obscenity," argued that "mere offensiveness cannot constitutionally
justify censorship" (-'Law of Obscenity," 378; cited in Clor, 1969,
118). I believe that once mere offensiveness becomes a legitimate
reason to suppress expression, freedom of expression will be curtailed
significantly, because "offensiveness" can be interpreted very
ideologically and politically. Salman Rushdie once questioned; "What is
freedom of expression? Without freedom to offend, it ceases to exist."
In the U.S. and Japan, however, offensiveness has been regarded as a
legitimate reason to regulate obscenity.
In the U.S., the Court added the "patently offensive" test to the
Roth test in Manual Enterprises v. Day (1962). Justice Harlan asserted
that the Roth decision established the "patently offensiveness" concept
no less than the "prurient interest" concept. On this assertion, Clor
argues that
' his opinion does not succeed in revealing just where in
the Roth case this concept is to be found" (Clor, 1969, 63-4). Manual
Enterprises v. Day was a case which involved magazines held to be
published primarily for homosexuals. The distinguising features of this
case arise from the fact that the prurience of the magazines was not
contested and was indeed acknowledged by all parties. The publisher
avowed that he had designed them to appeal to the prurient interest of
homosexuals (Clor, 1969, 60), The publishers sought injunctive relief
in the U.S. District Court. An injunction was denied, and the denial
was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed the lower courts. One of the reasons for reversal was that
"such magazines which have no interest for sexually normal individuals
cannot be legally obscene, since they are not so offensive on their
face as to affront current community standards of decency” (Ringel.
1970, 100-1). The Court held that "the material challenged under
section 1461 cannot be found to be obscene unless it is proved to be
both patently offensive and taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest" (Ringel, 1970, 101). In Memoirs ( 1966) , Ginsberg ( 1968)
,
and
Hiller (1973), this "patently offensive" test was affirmed.
In U.S. v. Kennerley (1913), Judge Learned Hand pointed out that
it seems hardly likely "that shame will for long prevent us from
adequate portrayal of the most serious and beautiful side of human
nature" (Kalven, 1960, 6), In Japan, however, the Supreme Court and
lower courts have traditionally emphasized the sense of shame in
deciding obscenity cases. It is true even in the Yojohan case which was
decided in 1980. It seems to me that this notion of shame, especially
in matters of sexual modesty ( Seiteki shuchishin ) has been utilized in
a very specific way by the Japanese Supreme Court. Also, the Court’s
emphasis on "the non-public nature of the sex act" ( Seikoi hikozen no
gensoku ) and its way of utilizing this concept in judging obscenity are
very peculiar to the Japanese Supreme Court. This must be partially
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attributable to the culture which has emphasized the notion of "shame."
I will come back to this topic in the conclusion. The Japanese Court’s
emphasis and exaggeration of protection of the sense of shame can be an
unreasonable repression and infringement of individual freedom of
expression. Is there a pressing necessity to protect the "sense of
shame"? It seems to me that this is a minor thing which happens in a
person’s private jurisdiction, especially in the case of reading
materials. When it comes to problems involving a captive audience,
offense of the sense of shame is not a minor problem.
Another question about the Japanese criteria for judging obscenity
is the ambiguity of the terms the courts have used. The Japanese
Supreme Court set criteria for materials to be held obscene; they must:
1) wantonly stimulate and arouse sexual desire: 2) offend the normal
sense of sexual modesty (sense of shame) of ordinary persons: 3) be
contrary to proper ideas of sexual morality. These three conditions
seem to be very interdependent compared with the American criteria. For
example, the second and third seem to be overlapping and even
repetitive. It is hard to imagine material which satisfies the first
and the second criteria but not the third. Moreover, the degree of
offensiveness required to render an expression obscene is clearer in
the American criteria than in the Japanese. The U.S. Supreme Court, in
Miller, stated that material has to describe or depict, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct "specifically defined by the applicable
state law.' The Japanese Supreme Court, on the other hand, has not
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offered such a guideline in distinguishing acceptable and unacceptable
descriptions. It is problematic in terms of "a fair notice."
C. Basic Differences Between Japan and the U.S.
There are some elements peculiar to the Japanese Supreme Court’s
approach. First, the concept of "the public welfare" used by the
Japanese judiciary is something more than "the general welfare" in the
American context. I believe that the public welfare doctrine is so
powerful that freedom of expression in Japan has been curtailed in an
unreasonably restrictive way. Second, the U.S. Supreme Court has
focused on the work’s utility or value in judging obscenity. The
Japanese Court, on the other hand, has traditionally and consistently-
emphasized "shame" and "sexual morality," which are very hard to grasp.
Obviously, the U.S. Court has also been concerned with sexual morality.
However, the Japanese Court has shown its moralistic concern more
clearly. In addition, I believe that such notions as " Shuchisin" and
"Haji” are something more than just "shame" in English. These notions
are unique to Japanese culture. Third, the U.S. Court has used the term
contemporary community standards," which never appeared in any of the
Japanese Court’s decisions, as the criterion for obscenity. Even though
this term, "community standards," is problematically vague, it at least
has a more democratic sound than the Japanese method - allowing the
judiciary to define "prevailing ideas of society." As a result of this
method, the Japanese judiciary has appeared to have achieved the status
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Of an authoritative preacher of morality. This paternalistic stance of
the judiciary is more explicit in the Japanese Supreme Court than its
American counterpart. Probably, this last difference is due partly to
the difference in the judicial process. Unlike the U.S., Japan has no
jury system. Also, the fact Japan is much smaller and more homogeneous
than the U.S. allows for some judicial differences.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
A. Harms Caused by "Obscene" Expression
In both Japan and the U.S., it has been held that freedom of
expression is not absolutely unlimited. In both countries, one of the
unanswered serious questions concerning obscenity is: What is the real
interest which is to be protected by regulating obscene expressions? To
regulate or penalize certain acts legally, there has to be a
substantial interest to be protected by such a regulation. Otherwise,
such a regulation would be against the rule of due process of law. In
the U.S., it has been contended that there are four possible evils:
(1) The incitement to antisocial sexual conduct;
(2) Psychological excitement resulting from sexual imagery;
(3) The arousal of feelings of disgust and revulsion; and
(4) The advocacy of improper sexual values (Kalven, 1960. 4).
In addition, the impact of obscenity on character can be asserted as a
fifth possible evil (Kalven, 1960, 4).
1. Anti-Social Conduct and Sex Crime
One position advocating regulation bases its claim on the concern
with sex crimes and other socially undesirable conduct. Edgar Hoover
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contended that:
The increase in the number
literature madly presented
is the great moral wrecker
jails can be built (Downs,
of sex crimes is due precisely to sex
in certain magazines. Filthy literature
It is creating criminals faster than
Ed., 1960, 24).
Those who advocate the regulation of obscenity because of this concern
believe that the thoughts stimulated by sexually explicit expression
are steps to socially undesirable actions (Downs. Ed., 1960. 24).
However, the link between obscene materials and sex crimes has not been
established. The report by The Presidential Commission on Obscenity and
Pornography
( Die Johnson Report") presented a recommendation saying
that "there is no warrant for continued governmental interference with
the full freedom of adults to read, obtain or view whatever such
material they wish" (The Obscenity Report, 1971, 99). This
recommendation was based on their finding that there was no link
between antisocial conduct and consumption of pornography. Beer
contends that "(U)ntil highly probable evidence arises of their
substantial social danger, it might be better to downplay the content
of erotica as being close to irrelevant to law and judicial decisions
on obscenity" (Beer, 1984, 354). Gellhorn argues that those who take
the position of Hoover just overstate the significance of words and
pictures and understate the other elements of life that shape human
behavior, and that freedom of communication and freedom to read ought
not to be among the sacrifices when the gain is so dubious and the
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deprivation so plain (Downs, Ed., 1960, 25-6). It has never been proven
that the danger posed by obscene materials is sufficient to justify the
exercise of judicial power for its suppression. On this point, Pilpel
claims that the ’clear and present danger" test still appears to be the
only sound constitutional basis for regulation. The Supreme Court has
used this test for all speech and press with the exception of obscenity
(Downs and McCoy, Eds., 1984, 236). It is not clear why this test has
not been applied to obscenity.
2. Juvenile Delinquency
The effect of obscene writings on juvenile delinquency is another
concern. On this issue, Gellhorn argues that the most exhaustive study
of juvenile delinquency showed that reading seems to be of small moment
in shaping antisocial tendencies. He refers to the study by the Bureau
of Mental Health Services of the Domestic Relations Court of New York,
which found a marked retardation among the children whose conduct has
brought them before the court:
Pat from discovering that delinquency grew out of reading, the
clinicians have discovered that among New Yorkers it is more
likely to grow out of inability to read (Downs, Ed., 1960, 25).
Even if exposure to explicit sexual materials does negatively affect
young persons, it does not necessarily justify limiting freedom of
expression of adults. Moreover, reading materials are different from
visual materials in that the former require intellectual ability to be
118
understood. It takes time, effort, and ability to understand the
message contained in reading materials. Okudaira claims that a juvenile
who can read and understand Yojohan, for example, is to be considered
to possess a certain level of rationality, and to be treated equally to
a mature adult (Okudaira, Tamaki, and Yoshiyuki, 1986, 165).
3. Stimulation of Sexual Desire and Arousing Revulsion
Both Supreme Courts have taken it for granted that materials
stimulating sexual desire or unconventional sexual ideas are
detrimental. However, should literature be censored just because it has
the potential to arouse lustful desire? Even if certain sexually
explicit materials "offend a sense of shame" or "arouse lust." it is
not necessarily evident whether or not offending a sense of shame or
arousing sexual desire is a harm which is serious enough to justify the
regulation of otherwise free expression. Gellhorn contends that
(L)nless the human race is to vanish entirely, we can scarcely afford
to regard the arousing of normal sexual desires as a social danger to
be curbed at all costs" (Downs, Ed., 1960, 24). There is a position
which advocates the regulation of obscene materials in terms of
people s right "not to see." However, in the case of reading materials,
if one person finds that they are offensive, s/he is free to stop
reading. If s/he voluntarily chooses to read something knowing its
offensiveness, should the state intervene to stop him or her from being
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offender Kalven argues that "(A) rousing disgust and revulsion in a
voluntary audience seems an impossibly trivial base for making speech a
(Kalven, 1960, 4). In his article, "Restraints On Book Reading."
Walter Gellhorn persuasively presents an argument for freedom to read:
It is one thing to say that nobody should force upon everybody’snuj ling eyes or ears a communication they deem outrageous It is
; :„r:
h
: h
r thing to say that —^ must f lrs t zZe ncontent of t e communication before it may be transmitted to
a v body who is willing to receive it. Books are voluntarily readThey are not obtruded upon the passer-by, regardless of his
c oice. To be let alone, as Justice Brandeis said, is the mostprecious of all human rights. In the one case it dictates that
none should be compelled to read or listen to what he abhors. Intie other it dictates that none should be precluded from writing
or reading as his own rather than another’s taste may determine(Downs, Ed.
, 1960, 40)
.
In the conclusion of this article, Gellhorn argues:
Like any other freedom, the freedom to read can be used unwisely.
But fear that freedom may be improvidently exercised does notjustify its destruction. Foolish reading cannot be ended by force(Downs, Ed., I960, 41).
As he contends, reading is a very private and voluntary act. In the
case of reading, readers are not a captive audience. They choose to
read and to keep reading. As Kalven argues, as long as a mature person
voluntarily chooses to read certain materials, a government does not
have to worry about the negative feeling s/he might have owing to the
reading (Kalven, 1960, 4). On the state’s concern to regulate adult
erotica, Beer contends:
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A questio^e paternalism, an excessively pejorative reading of
exaggeration ofT'* ‘T ° f interest in eroti™ »ndf the resultant social benefits seem implied bv apreoccupation with legal control of adult erotica (Beer. 1984 ,'
Beer argues that "(U)nder the right of privacy, as long as another
person’s right not to be exposed to erotica against his/her will is not
violated, the individual adult should have a constitutional right to
receive, hear, see, and/or read erotica" (Beer, 1984, 354). As Beer
suggests, I believe that the issue which should be taken seriously is
the right of people who do not want to see certain things. He says;
lore realistic and reasonable seems a legal preoccupation with
protecting every man’s right not to have his privacy with regard
to sex invaded by unwanted and offensive exposure to salacious
advertising and other selling techniques (Beer, 1984, 354).
I believe that the prevailing manner of advertising and selling
sexually explicit materials in Japan is very inconsiderate of
individual rights compared with that of the U.S. During a commute to
Tokyo by train, it is inevitable that one sees salacious advertisements
in the train, on the platform, in the newspapers, or in the magazine
the person sitting next to you is reading. Similarly, the fact that in
Japan pornography is sold in vending machines on the street reflects a
lack of sensitivity to people who do not want to see it. As Beer points
out, the privacy-based theory is good in the sense that freedom of
expression and the right to know and enjoy according to one’s private
needs, wants, and conscience would receive full protection.
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4. The Public Welfare Doctrine
The Japanese Supreme Court has repeatedly maintained that obscene
expression is harmful to the "public welfare," because "it contains the
danger of inducing a disregard for sexual morality and sexual order"
(Maki, 1964, 8). The Japanese Supreme Court has been criticized for
using this public welfare doctrine very widely and freely. Besides
Articles 12 and 13 of the Constitution, such articles as Articles 22
and 29 of the Constitution also contain the term the "public welfare,"
but none of these provisions makes clear what the "public welfare" is.
In Japan v. Sugino (1950), the Court presented a definition of the
public welfare' meaning the maintenance of order and respect for the
fundamental human rights of the individual, but this wording is
dangerously wide and too abstract to be a legally workable definition.
In addition to these provisions in the Constitution, Article 1 of the
Civil Code prescribes that "(A) 11 private rights shall conform to the
public welfare." According to the Japanese Supreme Court’s decisions,
the "pubic welfare" appears to be the supreme value under the Japanese
Constitution. However, this may actually be a supreme value under the
Japanese "communitarian feudal democracy" (Ishida and Kraus, Eds.,
1989, 85), which I already mentioned in Chapter I.
The "public welfare" doctrine has been used to justify the
limitations on freedom. However, I believe that freedom of expression
is essential to the public welfare, not only to the maintenance of the
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public welfare, but also to the promotion and sophistication of the
public welfare.
5. Morality
The negative effect on public morality and sexual values is one of
the major harms allegedly caused by certain sexually explicit
materials. Both the U.S. and Japanese Supreme Courts, as we have seen,
have articulated their concern with public morality on several
occasions. In contemporary society, however, people can hardly agree on
standards of conduct, language, manners, and on what can be seen and
heard. The degree of the lack of consensus is different in the U.S. and
Japan, but reaching a consensus is increasingly difficult in both
societies. The Reverend Jerry Falwell, founder of the Moral Majority,
Inc., argues that America s traditional values are being undermined by
those who remove God from all public institutions. He claims:
Humanists believe that man is his own god and that moral values
are relative, that ethics are situational... Humanism places man
at the center of the universe... Man lives a meaningless existence
in which the only important thing is for him to make himself happy
in the here and now. It is a philosophy of "do your own thing."
Its slogan is "If it feels good, do it." Neither philosophy offers
moral absolutes, a right and a wrong (O’Neill, Ed., 1985, 153-4).
According to Falwell, this "false" amoral concept of the humanist
threatens the stability of the nation (O’Neill, Ed., 1985, 151). Janice
Raymond formulates this chaos as a "tyranny of tolerance," meaning that
every individual desire has become a political or cultural difference.
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No value judgment can be made, because that Is being divisive (Itzln.
Ed., 1992, 174 )
.
Raymond’s comment is made in her article "Pornography
and Politics of Lesbianism," which is a critical discussion of Lesbian
sado-masochist groups. In this article, she presents her concern with
the current situation in which everything is acceptable in the name of
individual difference. In a sense, her concern is sound. It seems that
we are living in a world which has no ground for the judgment of right
or wrong. In another sense, however, this may be an unavoidable aspect
of a modern liberal society.
In Western societies, the Church has been an influential preacher
of sexual morality for a long time. However, by the end of the
Protestant reformation, the power of the Church had been vastly diluted
and passed largely to the civil authority (Daily, 1973, 213). Daily
points out that "(I)n maintaining laws regarding obscenity, the civil
authority was taking over the duties of the Church" (Daily, 1973, 213).
A secular government, however, is not supposed to be the paternalistic
administrator of the morality of the nation. It is very questionable
whether or not literature can be repressed just because it offends the
moral code of the censor. David A.J. Richards contends that obscenity
law is a desperate but doomed attempt to give a repressive morality
legal force" (Richards, 1980, 120; Hunter, Saunders, and Williamson,
1993, 201). Richards’ comment was made in his critique of the U.S.
Supreme Court, but it is very applicable to its Japanese counterpart as
well. The Japanese Supreme Court has repeatedly argued that the
"prevailing ideas of society" are the standard of obscenity, but these
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ideas are not a social reality but rather something the Court should
judge. The Japanese Supreme Court has recognized itself as being
charged with the clinical role in maintaining morality. In Paris Adult
Theatre 1 v. Slaton (1973). the U.S. Supreme Court used an argument
similar to the traditional Japanese approach, which justifies
regulation of certain expression, in the name of the social interest of
preserving sound moral order. On the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in
197.3, which include the Paris and Miller cases, Richards argues that
these obscenity decisions incorrectly "endorsed a particular moral and
political view at the expense of other views and capacities for
experience, under the guise of making a morally neutral legal
judgement" (Richards, 1980, 120). Critics such as Justices Black and
Douglas argued that "all obscenity laws are a form of thought control -
a virulent restraint and a government effort to regulate not what we
do, not even what we say, but what may come into our minds" (Downs and
MacCoy, Eds., 1984, 235). In a democracy, neither a government nor a
court is a preacher of morality. As many Japanese scholars have argued,
the Japanese Supreme Court s claim that the courts are the guardian of
sound morality should be regarded as an arrogation of authority. Pifpel
claims that many of the Justices are saying, in effect, "This obscene
materia] which we must look at in the course of our judging process
can't and doesn’t hurt us, but we’re afraid it might hurt the rest of
you” (Downs and McCoy, Eds., 1984, 237). It appears that the Supreme
Court believes that "those who are qualified to identify evil and
mistake should be empowered to prevent their dissemination" (Downs,
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Ed., I960, 21), which is a common belief to justify censorship. I
suspect that this stance allows a moral paternalism or even a moral
totalitarianism. The state which is dedicated to democratic principles
should not demand our absolute obedience in every aspect of our lives.
Democracy is a regime which recognizes that "there are aspects of human
life which the state may not legitimately control" (Hallowell, 1954
,
117). Basically, I do not think that the judiciary in a liberal
democracy should judge which ideas are moral or immoral, pure or
impure, or normal or abnormal. To have an idea, which might be regarded
as unorthodox or immoral according to the Court’s standard, is not
something to be penalized unless it causes some evident social harm.
In Denmark, all restrictions on pornography were dropped by 1969.
This legalization of pornography, however, "doesn’t mean they approve"
(Moskin, 1969. 73). One Danish psychiatrist, Dr. Hertoft, explained the
Danish background by describing that "(P)eople said we may not like
pornography, but we want to make our own choice. They don’t accept that
the state wants to be parent of the people" (Moskin, 1969, 73 ). The
basic questions posed in the removal of restrictions were as follows:
Why should someone be punished for buying an erotic book or sexy
picture? Should the power of the state be used to enforce rules of
morality? Does pornography have a damaging effect on the user or anyone
else? (Moskin, 1969, 73). These are questions which have to be answered
before legalization, but most of these questions have never been
seriously examined in either Japan or the U.S. In Denmark, people
decided to let the self-regulating forces of society control the porno
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business. This means that people chose self-determination over the
paternalistic intervention of government in preserving sexual morality.
Self-determination is one of the fundamental premises of democracy. On
the issue of self-determination and morality, the Johnson Report
concluded
:
Governmental regulation of moral choice can deprive the individualOf the responsibility for personal decision which is essential tothe formation of genuine moral standards. Such regulation would
also tend to establish an official moral orthodoxy, contrary to
our most fundamental constitutional traditions (The Obscenity
Report, 1971, 103). -
In the L.S., until the case Kingsley International Pictures
Corporation v. Regents of the University of New York (1959), the courts
found material obscene simply because it challenged current moral
standards. Lockhart and McClure argue that Kingsley Pictures put an end
to censorship for ideological obscenity. In this decision, the Court
ruled that the the constitutional guarantee of the freedom to advocate
ideas protects the right to advocate that adultery may be proper in
some circumstances. The main thrust of the opinion in this ruling was a
declaration of the constitutional right to advocate unconventional
ideas and behavior "immoral” by current standards (Lockhart and
McClure, 1960, 99-100). Given that the objectionable nature of some
ideas played a prominent role in many obscenity decisions before 1959,
Kingsley Pictures certainly marked a significant progress. I believe
that it is an individual responsibility to decide the best moralilty
among all possible moral standards. One problem is that the principle
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Of individual choice or self-determination presupposes that every
individual is a rational moral agent.
Those who advocate regulating sexually explicit materials very
often believe that "obscene” materials will lead a society to the
breakdown of sexual morality. The following claim by Clor is
representative. Clor believes that the objective of government in
censoring obscenity is not to turn people’s mind toward more worthy
thoughts, but to inhibit influences which corrupt moral character.
Constant exposure to literary and visual materials which
overemphasize sensuality and brutality, reduce love to sex, and
) atantly expose to public view intimacies which have been thought
sacred or private must eventually result in an erosion of moral
standards (Clor, 1969, 170).
It seems to me that both Japanese and American courts have agreed with
Clor. Both judiciaries have been very fearful of the negative impact of
sexually explicit expression on sexual morality, and this is why sexual
descriptions have been treated very restrictively
. However, it is not
necessarily clear why "sexual" morality has been treated as very
special among various moralities. On this point, Kalven argues that the
topic of obscenity is freighted with all the anxieties and hypocrisies
of society’s attitude toward sex (Kalven, 1960, 45). Clor cites
Margaret Mead s observation: "Every known human society exercises some
explicit censorship over behavior relating to the human body,
especially as that behavior involves or may involve sex" (Clor, 1969,
190). He points out that there is no known society in which matters
relating to sex are left wholly to individuals or to spontaneous social
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activity (dor. 1969. 190). Further, Clor maintains that - (Democracy
cannot be characterized simply as the maximization of individual
liberty in every area of life" and that a person who devoted
exclusively to the satisfaction of sensual appetites is not a citizen
body at all (Clor, 1969, 200). Therefore, he concludes that it is
natural for government to be concerned with the sensual side of life.
Clearly, both the American and Japanese governments have been highly-
concerned with the sensual side of life. In Japan’s case, the Japanese
Supreme Court’s wording in the three decisions discussed in Chapter III
reflects a very "Japanese" way of thinking about sex and sexual
representation. The Japanese courts have repeatedly used the notions
llke
' nonpublic nature of the sex act" and "sense of shame." Of course,
the sex act is supposed to be "nonpublic" in the U.S., too. The U.S.
Supreme Court, however, never used such a term in its decisions. The
Japanese seem to consider not only the sex act itself but also the mere
discussion of sex as nonpublic. Traditionally, sex has been considered
as something concealed and as something exclusively kept inside
marriage. Gellhorn points out that the concept of obscenity is itself a
product of censorship and concealment.
The Japanese, conditioned by their training to regard kissing as
an entirely private exercise, are said to find American movies
filled with obscenity because they unabashedly portray
heterosexual osculation; and as a consequence films that do not
bring a blush to the most demure Americans must be drastically-
edited before they are deemed appropriate for general exhibition
in Japan (Downs, Ed., 1960, 22).
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This comment was made in 1956, and the situation has since changed.
Abramson and Hayashi found that Japanese regulations of pornography are
even looser than American regulations in several senses (Malamuth and
Donnerstein, Eds., 1984, 173-183). However, it is my pereeption that
the Japanese in the 1990s still regard sex as something which should
not be discussed openly. Every decent, it seems, person is supposed to
behave as if s/he had nothing to do with sex. This cultural heritage
may be interpreted as extreme modesty or shyness. Yet, I think such a
Japanese attitude toward sex is different from Puritan anti-sex-
morality which is inherently highly repressive about sex itself. It is
widely recognized that the U.S. became much more permissive toward
sexual representations since the 1960s. Apparently, American society is
now open about sex and sexuality. However, at bottom, repressive
attitudes toward sex, sexuality, and sexual representation still seem
to be surviving in American culture, because of perennial Puritanism.
For a long time, abortion and homosexuality have been discussed in the
light of religious and moral value judgments. The discussion of
obscenity and pornography also seems to reflect this sexual morality
rooted in Puritanism.
B. Modern Doctrine of Free Speech
It is very questionable that certain expression should be
prohibited simply because it is embarrassing and distasteful to the
majority, or disgusting to average sensibilities. It is my opinion that
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the concept of "offensiveness” can be given a political interpretation
by the majority or/and government. If pure distaste can be the ground
for suppression of a particular expression, freedom of expression will
he significantly limited. If the First Amendment permits the government
to suppress a publication which is offensive to a particular judge,
freedom under the First Amendment can be limited very arbitrarily.
Charles Rembar, the lawyer who won in Memoirs v. Massachusetts (1966)
argued that "(T)he (First) amendment is not designed to give effect to
majority wishes." As Rembar pointed out, for that, no First Amendment
is required. Freedom of speech and of the press means freedom for what
the majority thinks is bad. or thinks is evil, or dislikes, or even
hates with unequivocal hate (Friedman, Ed., 1970, 11-2 in
Introduction). Perhaps, this original philosophy of the First .Amendment
is already forgotten or undermined.
In the Communist view, there is no room for argument about the
desirability of suppressing disturbing ideas:
Uhy should freedom of speech and freedom of the press be
allowed?" Lenin asked. "Why should a government which is doing
what it believes to be right allow itself to be criticized?
W'hy should any man be allowed to buy a printing press and
disseminate pernicious opinions calculated to embarrass the
government?" (Downs, Ed., 1960, 27).
Gellhorn claims that he fears that there are non-Communist Americans
who may share this particular bit of the hated ideology (Downs, Ed.,
1960, 27).
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Since 1791 the First
.Amendment has stood as a safeguard of thefr edom of expression. The doctrine of political freedom it is
muddleh
‘ U
.
implement ls not a bit of eighteenth-century
eadedness. It reflects, rather, the lesson learned fromhistory that truth cannot be established by proclamation and that
I960 271™ ^ non-believers (Downs.
.Judge Hand once argued that "any organization of society which
depresses free and spontaneous meddling is on the decline, however
showy its immediate spoils" (Downs, Ed., 1960, 28). Gellhorn maintains
that the proscription of writings because of their feared effects on
accepted beliefs is not only unconstitutional but also unwise (Downs,
Ed., 1960, 27).
Donald A. Downs points out that the First .Amendment is based on
such liberal precepts as the legal tolerance and marketplace of ideas.
The principle of legal tolerance is that "individuals and society must
tolerate disagreeable speech unless it is clearly dangerous, part of
criminal action, or conspicuously without social value" (Downs, 1989.
4). The liberal approach holds that the best way to achieve political
and social justice is through an open marketplace of ideas (Downs,
1989, 4). Justice Holmes once maintained that "the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market" (Downs, Ed., 1960, 21). Richards also claims that we can
never be sure of knowing what the truth is, and the most likely way of
approximating it and preserving a democratic society is to maintain a
free marketplace of ideas (Hunter, Saunders, and Williamson, 1993,
200 ) .
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Sexually explicit materials have been treated as outside this free
marketplace of ideas. Indeed, "(I)t is hard to see why the advocacy of
improper sexual values should fare differently, as a consitutional
matter, from any other exposition in the realm of ideas" (Kalven, 1960.
4). Pilpel says, "There should be as free a marketplace for sexual
ideas and descriptions as we have now with reference to other kinds of
ideas and descriptions (Downs and McCoy, Eds., 1984, 236). As to the
regulation of obscenity, there are two opposing positions. One is that
the restriction of obscene materials from society is a threat to
freedom of expression, because it is an attempt to prevent people from
holding particular views about sexual relations and behavior. On the
other hand, there is an argument that obscene materials are an appeal
to the libido, not to reason, and therefore are not within the area of
expression protected by the First Amendment at all. My idea is close to
the former position. I believe that rejecting particular ideas
concerning sexuality and sexual relations is incompatible with the
fundamental idea of the marketplace of ideas, which is based on
tolerance of diversity among the values each individual holds.
In addition to the marketplace of ideas and legal tolerance, four
other assumptions underlie the modern doctrine of free speech. First,
the modern doctrine of free speech assumes that the individual citizen
is autonomous and responsible. Speakers are not held responsible for
illegal actions taken in response to their speech, unless the speech
incites immediate lawless action. Second, the modern doctrine takes a
limited notion of equality, defined as equal treatment under the law
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and equal opportunity to compete in the public forum or marketplace of
ideas. This notion of equality entails state neutrality in allocating
the right to speech. Third, the modern doctrine's concept of
citizenship and right applies to the individual rather than a class or
group. Fourth, the doctrine makes a basic, if imperfect and inexact,
distinction between speech and action. Speech is protected unless it
constitutes unlawful or tortuous action or is directly tied to unlawful
action, such as libel, incitement, solicitation, conspiracy or the like
(Downs, 1989, 5).
Downs referred to this modern doctrine of free speech in his
critique of the anti-pornography ordinance authored in late 1983 by
MacKinnon and Dworkin. In this paper, I have not explored the area of
pornography as distinct from obscenity, since it is another huge topic.
However, I need to mention briefly this anti-pornography ordinance
since it embraces another important dimension of the contemporary
discussion over sexually explicit materials. By means of this
ordinance, two nationally prominent anti-pornography feminists brought
about a controversy concerning the regulation of pornography. Their
ant i
-pornography ordinance is based on the belief that the current
framework of the First Amendment protects only the freedom of speech of
men, and silences women at the same time. The authors basically
challenged the state neutral doctrine as inappropriate. They attack the
traditional "obscenity" approach as being sex-neutral, and thus
incompatible with reality. What was new about the logic of this
ordinance was their formulation of pornography as sex discrimination,
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thus a Violation of women’s civil rights. They basically defined
pornography as materials which eroticize dominance and submission, or
depict women in a degrading manner. Even though this ordinance had
problems in terms of its constitutionality, its new approach was at
Ipast inspiring and innovative.
In 1986. in American Booksellers Association Inc. v. Hudnut, the
ordinance was held unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court cited the
appellate court decision in Chicago that the Indianapolis law was an
attempt at "thought control," and affirmed, without issuing an opinion
the rulings by lower courts. In fact, Dworkin and MacKinnon dealt with
pornography not as mere speech, but as action. According to Andrea
Dworkin’ s theory, thoughts and ideas are made "as suspect as actions"
(Dworkin, 1989, 156). This merging of speech and action was severely
criticized. Another criticism is that this ordinance’s definition of
pornography was based on a sexist viewpoint. With this ordinance,
MacKinnon and Dworkin questioned both the First Amendment itself and
underlying modern doctrine of free speech. Their claim is that "(T)he
modern doctrine of free speech, ... assumes an essential equality of
social condition that simply does not exist, so it perpetuates the
power of the gender favored by the status quo" (Downs, 1989, 15 in
Introduction). All of the above-mentioned four assumptions underlying
the modern doctrine of free speech were challenged by these feminists.
First, under the ordinance, speakers (makers of pornography) are held
responsible for the crimes committed by its users. Second, the
ordinance requires states to go beyond the neutral position. Third, the
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ordinance treats women as a group, which
individualistic presumption. Fourth, the
is counter to the
ordinance merges speech with
action.
To a certain extent, the concern of anti-pornography feminists
with sexist images and messages carried by pornography is reasonable.
However, the liberal doctrine of free speech has to be preserved in a
"liberal- democracy. The First .Amendment, even if it has a problem
according to the anti-pornography feminists’ view, largely relies on
liberal principles. In the anti-pornography feminists’ view, the
constitutional framework, which is based on a liberal philosophy, is
totally dominated by male interests. This argument is just like their
typical contention that every act of sex between heterosexuals is total
war and domination. In Andrea Dworkin’s view, sex is power, and all
power belongs to the man. Downs claims that the anti-pornographv
ordinance lacked perspective and a sense of limits. He contends that
"(I)f all liberal reality was a hell of domination, the anti-
pornography ordinance was a promise of total, utopian justice” (Downs,
1989, 50). In summary, Dworkin and MacKinnon’s ordinance is not
acceptable under the current American constitutional framework, because
their merger of speech and action is incompatible with the liberal
principle of free speech which is one of the foundations of democracy.
However, they were successful at least in giving people a new
perspective. In Japan, the discussion of sexually explicit materials is
still limited to the one which is based on the tradtional moralistic
"obscenity" perspective, which is sex-neutral. The formulation of
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pornography as a form of sex discrimination has not. as yet. been
really prevalent in Japan. I do not think that anybody has ever
attacked Article 21 of the Constitution by saying. "Freedom of
expression under this article is beneficial only for men. and is
oppressive for women." Clearly, there are lots of inequalities between
men and women in Japan, and men are privileged in many ways. It is
interesting that the argument focusing on sexism has not been presented
in Japan, which appears to be more sexist and more patriarchal than the
U.S.
C. Freedom of Expression and Liberal Democracy
Both the U.S. and Japan belong to the category of "liberal
democracy." In a democracy, the majority has the right to restrain an
individual’s liberty "in order to protect society from potential harm
and to support communitarian norms or sexual virtue" (Hall. Ed.. 1992
602-3). In a liberal state, however, tolerance of individual diversity
is a fundamental rule. Also, according to liberal principles, not only
potential harm but "direct, demonstrable harm to others" (Hall, Ed.,
1992, 603) is required before restricting expression. In this sense,
these two theses are inherently contradictory. I believe that such a
popular slogan as "Freedom and Peace" is also inherently contradictory.
If we pursue absolute freedom, we have to accept the possible
disruption of peace. If we want perfect peace, we have to give up
certain freedoms in exchange. Similarly, I believe that freedom of
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expression inherently has the potential to disturb decency or the
conventional moral code. Yet. the First Amendment largely relies on
liberal principles. In a "liberal” democracy, the liberal doctrine of
free speech has to be preserved and respected as much as possible. As
Downs claims, the liberal approach to the First Amendment is "necessary
to an open society, and an open society is a necessary condition for
achieving social justice," and "state neutrality is still necessary to
any workable regime of free speech" (Downs, 1989, 146). Even if
allegedly obscene material contains objectionable expression or ideas,
these ideas are still ideas. As long as speech is just taking the form
of speech, and as long as an idea stays an idea, liberal principles
protect them. Moreover, I believe that freedom to know includes the
freedom to know the darker or the hidden sides of human nature and
society.
Freedom of expression is different from other freedoms in that it
is not only an end itself but also a means of obtaining other things.
Fieedom of expression is a means of securing other fundamental human
rights, and of maintaining a democratic order (Okudaira, 1988, 59). In
Justice Benjamin Cardozo s words, freedom of speech and press is "the
matrix - the indispensable condition" of our other freedoms (Downs and
McCoy, Eds., 1984, 237). In this sense, infringement of freedom of
expression is something more than just infringement of one freedom.
This is why we should be very careful in restricting this freedom.
Freedom of expression is intimately related to the idea and
practice of a democracy. Emerson argues that "(T)he crucial point ...
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IS not that freedom of expression is politically useful, but that it is
indispensable to the operation of a democratic form of government"
(Emerson, 1963, 10). Because freedom of expression is such an important
factor in a democracy, Emerson argues that the limitation on it should
be restricted to exceptional cases. Similarly, Gellhorn claims,
'(S)inre the free flow of words is essential to the proper functioning
of our governmental and intellectual institutions, restrictions upon
that flow should be regarded as abnormalities requiring especially
convincing justification" (Downs, Ed., 1960, 38). In the area of
obscenity, as we can see in both Japanese and American cases, it is
hard to say there is a convincing justification for regulating certain
expression. The regulations in both countries have been largely based
on ideological biases on the side of the courts, which reject ideas
challenging the current moral standards. Such an ideological
intervention by the state is regarded as illegitimate in other areas of
expression, but obscenity has been treated as an exception because it
allegedly affects sexual morality, about which the states have been
exceptionally nervous.
As long as we cannot prove any substantial harm to be prevented by
restricting publication or distribution of obscene materials, the
regulation of certain expression would be inherently a threat to
freedom of expression and to a liberal society. I do not think such
alleged harms as an increase in sex crime, juvenile delinquency,
offense of readers’ sense of shame, danger of indulging in sex, and
moral deterioration can reasonably justify the regulation of certain
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sexually explicit materials. I believe that they are either too trivial
or not well-proven to be a solid justification for restricting
otherwise free expression. Moreover, I do not think that restricting
publication and distribution of certain sexually explicit materials is
either essential or effective in preserving sexual morality and
dignity. Article 175 of the Japanese Criminal Code, which penalizes
publication and distribution of "obscene" materials altogether is
dangerously broad. However, I am not saying that current methods of
producing, advertising, presenting, and distributing sexually explicit
materials are without problems. As mentioned already, regulation based
on the right of privacy is something the courts should think about
seriously.
Basically, I have taken a position favoring freedom of sexual
expression. Yet, Suzanne Kappeler’s argument, which follows, makes me
rethink whether or not the "No Censorship" position is the most
desirable. She claims that "(T)he freedom our society protects is not
the freedom of expression, but the freedom of the market" (Itzin, Ed.,
1992, 89), and continues;
To be "for freedom of expression," when that means being for the
status quo of the market and the pornography industry, can by no
stretch of the imagination be seen as being for freedom... "No
Censorship" position does not mean a shift of responsibility from
the state to the individual, but a shrinking of all responsibility
(Itzin, Ed., 1992, 90-1).
Especially when it comes to the pornography industry, this problem is
serious. Pornography, which I did not examine in this paper, has been
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an important issue in the U.S. and has been emerging as such in Japan.
As Kappeler points out, this is an issue not only about expression but
also about market. There are people who are profiting by taking
advantage of other people’s prurient interests. Also, in the
pornography industry, women and children are exploited economically and
sexually. The pornography industry is an industry which exploits the
poorest and most vulnerable group of population. Once a freedom is
established, there always appear people who abuse the freedom. It is
not known whether the pornography industry exists to satisfy the
demand, or people buy pornography just because there is an available
supply. Kappeler
’ s comments makes one notice another dimension of this
issue
.
Tt is unlikely that the Courts of Japan and the U.S. will suddenly
stop regulating allegedly obscene materials. If the Courts still choose
to regulate them, the standard of obscenity should at least be placed
on "the prevailing ideas of society," not in the sense the Japanese
Court has been using it, but in a real sense. This will approximate
what the American courts have been calling "contemporary community
standards." The standard of obscenity must be "contemporary" and
reflect the prevailing ideas, which keep changing. To set such
standards, as D.H. Lawrence claimed, the judgment should be left not to
particular judges but to the majority of a community. That is a
fundamental rule of democracy.
However, as Toqueville warned, in a democracy, there is such a
thing as "the tyranny of the majority." There is always a danger in a
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democracy that the majority will impose its will on a minority. This is
why freedom of expression needs special protection In a democracy.
Hallowell argues that the principle of majority rule does not mean that
we abandon all qualitative judgments in favor of a quantitative method.
If the principle of majority rule means that the will of the
majority must be conceived as unlimited and absolute, then it is aprinciple, as the framers of our Constitution realized, that isindistinguishable from tyranny. For the essence of tyranny is
'
unrestrained will -- whether it be the will of one man, of
several, or of many. And the tyranny of a majority is no less
cruel or unjust - indeed, may be more so - than the tyranny of a
single individual (Hallowell, 1954, 120).
As Hallowell points out, the principle of majority rule does not mean
the will of majority should unconditionally prevail over the will of
the few. Rather, this principle is founded upon the belief that "the
widest possible popular discussion and participation in the formation
of policy is likely to yield wiser decisions than a discussion limited
to the few" (Hallowell, 1954, 121). To secure the popular discussion
and participation, freedom of expresion is essential. Once freedom of
expression becomes a formality in a constitution, a liberal democracy
can easily become something not entirely different from
totalitarianism. In this sense, I believe that Charles Rembar’s claim
highlights a very crucial characteristic of freedom of expression in a
democracy:
Freedom of speech and of the press means freedom for what the
majority thinks is bad, or thinks is evil, or dislikes, or even
hates with unequivocal hate (Friedman, Ed., 1970, 11-2 in
Introduction)
.
142
If the courts choose to regulate expressions, they have to be extremely
careful not to allow "the tyranny of the majority- to control the
situation. Specifically concerning sexual expression, it seems to be
very easy to allow control by the tyranny of the majority in both the
U.S. and Japan.
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